Lastly, Government expressed their willingness to accept and finance the Convention’s scheme for land purchase and to give a large grant for urban housing.

The question now before the Convention was whether it should or should not accept this offer, which differed from the Midleton proposals in that it withheld the control of excise as well as of customs, and that it retained control of police and Post Office for the war period.  It also adumbrated an Ulster Committee, which had been an unpopular suggestion when put forward in the presentation stages.  On the other hand, it offered great material inducements in the proposed expenditure for land purchase and for housing.  Some of the County Councillors who had been most vehement in their opposition to the Midleton compromise were now disposed to think this too good an offer to let go, but believed it could be obtained without their taking the responsibility of voting for it.  It was necessary to point out that the Irish party could not lower a standard of national demand set up by the Nationalists in the Convention, and that if they did so they would be hooted out of existence.

The main argument of those who advised against acceptance was that Ministers had pledged themselves to act in any case.  Let them.  We could best help by enunciating our own programme.  Then they would know the real facts of the Irish situation.  If a majority of the Convention accepted the proposals of the Prime Minister’s letter, there was no pledge that the Bill would be on those lines.  We needed to keep a bargaining margin in what we put forward.  It was even suggested that the Government proposals would be more likely to attract support in Ireland if put forward as a generous offer from a largely Unionist Government than if published as a compromise to which Nationalists had condescended.

Our reply was that the essential thing was to make a beginning with self-government, and that by refusing to accept the Government’s offer, on which alone we could combine with an influential Unionist section, we gravely increased the difficulties in the way of carrying Home Rule.  If, as we held, the main need was to unite Ireland, the last thing on which we should insist was the concession of complete financial powers.  When the lack of those powers began to prove itself injurious to Ireland’s material interests, Ireland would certainly become united in a demand for the concession of them; and the history of the British Empire since the loss of America showed that every such demand had been granted to a self-governing State.

At this moment interest centred on the discussion in private councils of Nationalists.  The debates in full Convention were animated, but somewhat unreal by comparison.  Lord Midleton’s motion had been dropped, by consent, for a series of resolutions tabled by Lord MacDonnell which were in substance an acceptance of Government’s proposal.

But neither in the private councils nor in the public debates had we Redmond’s presence.  His illness had grown serious; an operation was necessary; it passed over hopefully, and on Tuesday, March 5th, when the debate resumed, Mr. Clancy had a telegram saying that he was practically out of danger.