“Although it was not always easy to do business with him, being very justly suspicious of English politicians, he could be trusted more implicitly than almost every other politician I have ever come in contact with.  He was slow to pass his word, but when he had done so, you knew he would keep it to the very letter, and what was almost as important, his silence and discretion could be relied upon with certainty.  He was constitutionally incapable of giving anybody away who had trusted him.”

Nothing but considerations of loyalty had kept him publicly silent in the months of this year when so much was done, and so much left undone, against his desire and his judgment.  In June, the Sixteenth Division was within 1,000 of completion.  The shortage existed in one brigade—­the 49th—­which had been formed of battalions having their recruiting areas in Ulster—­two of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, one of the Inniskillings and one of the Royal Irish Rifles.  The conception had undoubtedly been to provide for the Nationalists of Ulster.  But, as it proved, these men vastly preferred to enlist in units which were not associated with the avowedly Unionist Division, all of whose battalions belonged to one or other of these three regiments; and the 49th Brigade was not nearly up to strength.  The Tenth Division was now on the point of readiness for the field; but when the final weeding out of unfit or half trained men was completed its ranks were 1,200 short.  The War Office decided to draw, not on both the other Irish Divisions, but on the Sixteenth only, and only upon the deficient brigade.  When the offer of immediate service was made, every man in its four battalions volunteered, and the Tenth Division was completed; but the Sixteenth was thrown back, and the discouraging rumour that it was to be only used as a reserve gained a great impetus.  Redmond was very angry.  He wrote to Mr. Tennant demanding that at least the Division’s deficiency should at once be made up, by giving to us the full product of one or two weeks’ recruiting in Ireland.  Nothing of the kind was done to meet his request.

It was, however, some compensation to think that at least one of our purely Irish formations was going to take the field; and we hoped that its fortunes might remedy a complaint which began to be loudly made—­that credit was withheld from the achievements of Irish troops.

The main source of this grievance was the publication of Admiral de Robeck’s despatch concerning the first landing at Gallipoli.  In the original document, a schedule was given showing the detail of troops told off to each of the separate landings; and the narrative, in which a sailor spoke with frank enthusiasm of the desperate valour shown by soldiers, was written with constant reference to the detail given.  As some evil chance willed, the narrative mentioned by name several of the regiments engaged; but when it came to describe the forlorn hope at “V” Beach, it dealt fully with the special difficulties, and said in brief but emphatic phrase, “Here the troops wrought miracles.”  The War Office, in editing the despatch for publication, suppressed the schedule, as likely to give information to the enemy, so that in this case it did not appear to whom the praise applied.