From the very outset of his campaign in Ireland he had two hostilities to meet.  The first was that of the section which had always been opposed to him—­the Unionist party.  Into this block he had already driven a wedge.  The Irish Times, its principal organ in the South and West, was now backing him heartily, and, as has been seen, not a few leading Unionists were doing their utmost to assist.  But the real opposition, that of Ulster, was in no way conciliated.  On September 28th, “Covenant Day,” a great meeting was held at which the Ulstermen denounced what they called the Government’s treachery, and declared their implacable determination never to submit to Home Rule.  Mr. Bonar Law for the British Unionists proclaimed that whereas heretofore his party were willing to be bound by the verdict of a general election, they now withdrew that condition, and without any reservation would support Ulster in whatever course it chose to adopt.

In a purely partisan sense these speeches, and this attitude, did Redmond no harm in his campaign with Nationalists.  When a certain section of Home Rulers were clamouring that he had been tricked and betrayed by the Government, had given all and got nothing, it was a good rejoinder to point to the fact that in Ulster’s opinion the opportunity had been used to gain an unfair victory for Home Rule.  But Redmond from the outbreak of the war had no concern with party or partisan arguments.  He wanted a real truce, an end of bitterness, in Ireland.

There was, moreover, a feature of the Ulster propaganda in these days which disturbed him.  General Richardson, a retired Indian officer, who had chief command of the Ulster Volunteer Force, in appealing for recruits, urged the Volunteers “to recollect the events of March last and what the Navy and Army did for Ulster.  They came to the help of Ulster in the day of trouble, and would come again.”  He added his assurance to the Volunteers that “when the war was over, and their ranks were reinforced by some 12,000 men, thoroughly well trained and with vast field experience, they would return to the attack and relegate Home Rule to the devil.”

It did not assist Redmond in gaining recruits for the Army that a general officer should represent the services as trusty and proven allies of gentlemen whose leading idea in life was to relegate Home Rule to such a destination The average Nationalist civilian did not easily discriminate between what was said by a retired officer out of commission and what was said by officers in uniform.  There was a tendency to regard General Richardson as speaking of right for the Army—­for which Nationalist recruits were desired.

The Liberal Government could not help Redmond to allay Ulster or Unionist hostility.  One thing they could do; they could ensure that whatever concession or privilege was extended to those who followed Sir Edward Carson should be equally accorded to those who followed Redmond.  This one thing which they could have done they did not do.  They allowed the War Office to increase the arrogance of the Ulstermen and to weaken Redmond’s hand, giving Ulster special privileges, which inevitably created jealousy and suspicion in Nationalist Ireland—­as shall be shown in detail.