“Ab is a straight line between A and B,” and conclude that the line ab represents the shortest distance between two points A and B. In a manner similar to this Euclid built his whole mathematical system upon the basis of definitions and postulates, a system the complexity and thoroughness of which has caused all students of mathematics at one time or another to marvel and admire.  But, of course, a definition is little more than assigning a definite term to a definite thing.  It is when we begin to consider the premises that are necessary for arriving at the profound truths of the universe that we find the weakness of rationalism.  How are we going to be provided with premises for this end?  Shall we begin by saying “There is a God” or “There is no God”?  How is the pure reasoning faculty to decide upon the premises in the matter of the great Beyond?  We may weigh the arguments for and against a certain position, and we may think that the probability lies in a certain direction, but to decide finally and with certainty by mere cold logical reasoning is impossible.  We may bring out into prominence through logical reasoning truths that were previously only implicit, but to arrive at absolute truth with regard to the invisible world, through intellect alone, has long been admitted to be an impossibility.  The illusion of those who would believe that truth which was not already implied in the premises could ever be obtained by mere intellectual reasoning has long since been dispelled.

Perhaps it comes as a shock to the reader who has always insisted upon a clear intellectual understanding and a rigid reasoning upon all things, to find within what narrow limits, after all, the intellect itself has to work—­it can do little more than make more or less certain generalisations concerning the world of experience, and then to argue from these, or from definitions that it itself has framed.  Of course some of the ancient philosophers did try through a course of rigid reasoning to solve the great problems, and for a long time it was customary to expect that all philosophers should proceed in the same way.

Modern philosophers, of whom William James, Bergson, and Eucken are conspicuous examples, have appreciated the futility of such a task, and have sought other means of solving the problem.  The mistake in the past has been to forget that the intelligence is but one aspect of human life, and that the experience of mankind is far more complicated a matter than that of mere intellect, and not to be solved by intellect alone.  Intellect has to play a definite part in human life, but it does not constitute the whole of life.  Life itself is far greater than intellect, and to live is a far more important thing than to know.  The great things are life and action; knowledge is ultimately useful in so far as it contributes to the development of life and the perfection of action.  Philosophers have for too long a period made knowledge