the war of 1894 were fired, this ancient dislike, which amounted to a consuming hatred, had become a fixed idea.  Restrained by the world’s opinion during the period prior to the outbreak of the world-war as well as by the necessity of acting financially in concert with the other Powers, it was not until August, 1914, that the longed-for opportunity came and that Japan prepared to act in a most remarkable way.

The campaign against Kiaochow was unpopular from the outset among the Japanese public because it was felt that they were not legitimately called upon to interest themselves in such a remote question as the balance of power among European nations, which was what British warfare against Germany seemed to them to be.  Though some ill-will was felt against Germany for the part played by her in the intervention of 1895, it must not be forgotten that just as the Japanese navy is the child of the British navy, so is the Japanese army the child of the German army—­and that Japanese army chiefs largely control Japan.  These men were averse from “spoiling their army” in a contest which did not interest them.  There was also the feeling abroad that England by calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of her Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bargain, and that she was exploiting an old advantage in a way which could not fail to react adversely on Japan’s future world’s relationships.  Furthermore, it is necessary to underline the fact that official Japan was displeased by the tacit support an uninterested British Foreign Office had consistently given to the Yuan Shih-kai regime.  That the Chinese experiment was looked upon in England more with amusement than with concern irritated the Japanese—­more particularly as the British Foreign Office was issuing in the form of White Papers documents covering Yuan Shih-kai’s public declarations as if they were contributions to contemporary history.  Thus in the preceding year (1913) under the nomenclature of “affairs in China” the text of a dementi regarding the President of China’s Imperial aspirations had been published,—­a document which Japanese had classified as a studied lie, and as an act of presumption because its working showed that its author intended to keep his back turned on Japan.  The Dictator had declared:—­

...  From my student days, I, Yuan Shih-kai, have admired the example of the Emperors Yao and Shun, who treated the empire as a public trust, and considered that the record of a dynasty in history for good or ill is inseparably bound up with the public spirit or self-seeking by which it has been animated.  On attaining middle age I grew more familiar with foreign affairs, was struck by the admirable republican system in France and America, and felt that they were a true embodiment of the democratic precepts of the ancients.  When last year the patriotic crusade started in Wuchang its echoes went forth into all the provinces, with