The Japanese, who owe their whole theocratic conception to the Chinese, just as they owe all their letters and their learning to them, still nominally look upon their ruler as the link between Heaven and Earth, and the central fact dominating their cosmogony.  Although the vast number of well-educated men who to-day crowd the cities of Japan are fully conscious of the bizarre nature of this belief in an age which has turned its back on superstition, nothing has yet been done to modify it because—­and this is the important point—­the structure of Japanese society is such that without a violent upheaval which shall hurl the military clan system irremediably to the ground, it is absolutely impossible for human equality to be admitted and the man-god theory to be destroyed.  So long as these two features-exist; that is so long as a privileged military caste supports and attempts to make all-powerful the man-god theory, so long will Japan be an international danger-spot because there will lack those democratic restraints which this war has shown are absolutely essential to secure a peaceful understanding among the nations.  It is for this reason that Japan will fail to attain the position the art-genius and industry of her people entitle her to and must limp behind the progress of the world unless a very radical revision of the constitution is achieved.  The disabilities which arise from an archaic survival are so great that they will affect China as adversely as Japan, and therefore should be universally understood.

Japanese history, if stripped of its superficial aspects, has a certain remarkable quality; it seems steeped in heroic blood.  The doctrine of force, which expresses itself in its crudest forms in Europe, has always been in Japan a system of heroic-action so fascinating to humanity at large that until recent times its international significance has not been realized.  The feudal organization of Japanese society which arose as a result of the armed conquest of the islands fifteen hundred years ago, precluded centralizating measures being taken because the Throne, relying on the virtues of Divine Ancestors rather than on any well-articulated political theory, was weak in all except certain quasisacerdotal qualities, and forced to rely on great chieftains for the execution of its mandates as well as for its defence.  The military title of “barbarian-conquering general,” which was first conferred on a great clan leader eight centuries ago, was a natural enough development when we remember that the autochthonous races were even then not yet pushed out of the main island, and were still battling with the advancing tide of Japanese civilization which was itself composed of several rival streams coming from the Asiatic mainland and from the Malayan archipelagoes.  This armed settlement saturates Japanese history and is responsible for the unending local wars and the glorification of the warrior.  The conception of triumphant generalship