dealings in China was based. These treaties, with
their always-recurring “most-favoured nation”
clause, and their implication of equal treatment for
all Powers alike, constitute the Public Law of the
Far East, just as much as the Treaties between the
Nations constitute the Public Law of Europe; and any
attempt to destroy, cripple, or limit their scope
and function has been very generally deemed an assault
on all the High Contracting Parties alike. By
a thoroughly Machiavellian piece of reasoning, those
who have been responsible for the framing of recent
Japanese policy, have held it essential to their plan
to keep the world chained to the principle of extraterritoriality
and Chinese Tariff and economic subjection because
these things, imposing as they necessarily do restrictions
and limitations in many fields, leave it free to the
Japanese to place themselves outside and beyond these
restrictions and limitations; and, by means of special
zones and secret encroachments, to extend their influence
so widely that ultimately foreign treaty-ports and
foreign interests may be left isolated and at the
mercy of the “Higher machinery” which their
hegemony is installing. The Chinese themselves,
it is hoped, will be gradually cajoled into acquiescing
in this very extraordinary state of affairs, because
being unorganized and split into suspicious groups,
they can be manipulated in such a way as to offer
no effective mass resistance to the Japanese advance,
and in the end may be induced to accept it as inevitable.
If the reader keeps these great facts carefully in
mind a new light will dawn on him and the urgency
of the Chinese question will be disclosed. The
Japanese Demands of 1915, instead of being fantastic
and far-fetched, as many have supposed, are shown
to be very intelligently drawn-up, the entire Treaty
position in China having been most exhaustively studied,
and every loophole into the vast region left untouched
by the ex-territorialized Powers marked down for invasion.
For Western nations, in spite of exorbitant demands
at certain periods in Chinese history, having mainly
limited themselves to acquiring coastal and communication
privileges, which were desired more for genuine purposes
of trade than for encompassing the destruction of Chinese
autonomy, are to-day in a disadvantageous position
which the Japanese have shown they thoroughly understand
by not only tightening their hold on Manchuria and
Shantung, but by going straight to the root of the
matter and declaring on every possible occasion that
they alone are responsible for the peace and safety
of the Far East—and this in spite of the
fact that their plan of 1915 was exposed and partially
frustrated. But the chief force behind the Japanese
Foreign Office, it should be noted, is militarist;
and it is a point of honour for the Military Party
to return to the charge in China again and again until
there is definite success or definite failure.