and loyally in the western way all the duties and obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and fine discovery.  It has been supposed by some that a powerful role was played in this business by the temptation to benefit materially by an astute move:  that is that China was greatly influenced in her decision by the knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties would instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity and pour into the depleted Central Treasury a monthly surplus of nearly two million Mexican dollars.  Paradoxical as it may sound in a country notoriously hard-pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no part whatever in convincing the Peking Government that the hour for action had arrived; nor again was there any question of real hostility to a nation which is so far removed from the East as to be meaningless to the masses.  The deep, underlying, decisive influence was simply expediency—­the most subtle of all political reasons and the hardest to define.  But just as Britain declared war because the invasion of Belgium brought to a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German policy; and just as America broke off relations because the scrapping of undertaking after undertaking regarding the sea-war made it imperative for her to act, so did China choose the right moment to enunciate the doctrine of her independence by voicing her determination to hold to the whole corpus of international sanctions on which her independence finally rests.  In the last analysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th February to the German Government was a categorical and unmistakable reply to all the insidious attempts which had been made since the beginning of the war to place her outside and beyond the operation of the Public Law of Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light that her future actions must be judged.  The leaders who direct the destinies of China became fully prepared for a state of belligerency from the moment they decided to speak; but they could not but be supremely anxious concerning the expression of that belligerency, since their international position had for years been such that a single false move might cripple them.

Let us make this clear.  Whilst China has been from the first fully prepared to co-operate with friendly Powers in the taking of war-measures which would ultimately improve her world-position, she has not been prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into foreign hands.  The argument that the mobilization of her resources could only be effectively dealt with by specially designated foreigners, for instance, has always been repellent to her because she knows from bitter experience that although Japan has played little or no part in the war, and indeed classifies herself as a semi-belligerent, the Tokio Government would not hesitate to use any opportunity which presented itself in China for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the spot she is the most competent