and far-reaching Foreign Policy had at last been inaugurated.  By responding rapidly and firmly to the invitation of the United States to associate herself with the stand taken against Germany’s piratical submarine warfare, China has undoubtedly won for herself a new place in the world’s esteem.  Both in Europe and America the news of this development awakened well-understandable enthusiasm, and convinced men that the Republic at last stood for something vital and real.  Until the 9th February, 1917, what China had been doing was not really to maintain her neutrality, since she had been unable to defend her territory from being made a common battleground in 1914:  she had been engaged in guarding and perpetuating her traditional impotency.  For whilst it may be accurate to declare—­a fact which few Westerners have realized—­that to the mass of the Chinese nation the various members of the European Family are undistinguishable from one another, there being little to choose in China between a Russian or a German, an Englishman or an Austrian, a Frenchman or a Greek, the trade-contact of a century had certainly taught to a great many that there was profit in certain directions and none in certain others.  It was perfectly well-known, for instance, that England stood for a sea-empire; that the sea was an universal road; that British ships, both mercantile and military, were the most numerous; and that other things being equal it must primarily be Britain more than any other European country which would influence Chinese destinies.  But the British Alliance with Japan had greatly weakened the trust which originally existed; and this added to the fact that Germany, although completely isolated and imprisoned by the sea, still maintained herself intact by reason of her marvellous war-machine, which had ploughed forward with such horrible results in a number of directions, had made inaction seem the best policy.  And yet, although the Chinese may be pardoned for not forming clear concepts regarding the rights and wrongs of the present conflict, they had undoubtedly realized that it was absolutely essential for them not to remain outside the circle of international friendships when a direct opportunity was offered them to step within.

It was a sudden inkling of these things which now dawned on the public mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm.  For the first time since Treaty relations with the Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced world-politics within its scope.  The Confucianist conception of the State, as being simply a regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient because it was locked to the past and indifferent to the future, had hitherto been supreme, foreign affairs being the result of unwilling contact at sea-ports or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet.  To find Chinese—­five years after the inauguration of their Republic—­ready to accept literally