be shown that the means which the political thought available on the Nationalist side has evolved for the attainment of their end, and which ex hypothesi are only to be justified on tactical grounds, are the least likely to succeed; and that, consequently, they should be abandoned in favour of a constructive policy which, to say the least, would not be less effective towards advancing the Home Rule cause, if that cause be sound, and which would at the same time help the advancement of Ireland in other than political directions.

Tactics form but a part of generalship, and half the success of generalship lies in making a correct estimate of the opposing forces.  This is as true of political as it is of military operations.  Now, of what do the forces opposed to Home Rule consist?  The Unionists, it may be admitted, are numerically but a small minority of the population of Ireland—­probably not more than one-fourth.  But what do they represent?  First, there are the landed gentry.  Let us again make a concession for the sake of argument and accept the view that this class so wantonly kept itself aloof from the life of the majority of the people that the Nationalists could not be expected to count them among the elements of a Home Rule Ireland.  I note, in passing, with extreme gratification that at the recent Land Conference it was declared by the tenants’ representatives that it was desirable, in the interests of Ireland, that the present owners of land should not be expatriated, and that inducements should be afforded to selling owners to continue to reside in the country.

But I may ignore this as I wish here to recall attention to that other element, which was, as I have already said, the real force which turned the British democracy against Home Rule—­I mean the commercial and industrial community in Belfast and other hives of industry in the north-east corner of the country, and in scattered localities elsewhere.  I have already admitted that the political importance of the industrial element was not appreciated in Irish Unionist circles.  No less remarkable is the way in which it has been ignored by the Nationalists.  The question which the Nationalists had to answer in 1886 and 1893, and which they have to answer to-day, is this:—­In the Ireland of their conception is the Unionist part of Ulster to be coerced or persuaded to come under the new regime?  To those who adopt the former alternative my reply is simply that, if England is to do the coercion, the idea is politically absurd.  If we were left to fight it out among ourselves, it is physically absurd.  The task of the Empire in South Africa was light compared with that which the Nationalists would have on hands.  I am aware that, at the time when we were all talking at concert pitch on the Irish Question, a good deal was said about dying in the last ditch by men who at the threat of any real trouble would be found more discreetly perched upon the first fence.  But