But they were soon undeceived.  Mr. Asquith, on his return, told the House of Commons what he had learnt during his few days’ sojourn in Ireland.  His first proposition was that the existing machinery of Government in Ireland had completely broken down.  That was undeniable.  It was the natural fruit of the Birrell regime.  Mr. Asquith was himself responsible for it.  But no more strange or illogical conclusion could be drawn from it than that which Mr. Asquith proceeded to propound.  This was that there was now “a unique opportunity for a new departure for the settlement of outstanding problems “—­which, when translated from Asquithian into plain English, meant that now was the time for Home Rule.  The pledge to postpone the question till after the war was to be swept aside, and, instead of building up by sound and sensible administration what Mr. Birrel’s abnegation of government had allowed to crumble into “breakdown,” the rebels were to be rewarded for traffic with the enemy and destruction of the central parts of Dublin, with great loss of life, by being allowed to point to the triumphant success of their activity, which was certain to prove the most effective of all possible propaganda for their political ideals in Ireland.

Some regard, however, was still to be paid to the promise of an Amending Bill.  The Prime Minister repeated that no one contemplated the coercion of Ulster; that an attempt must be made to come to agreement about the terms on which the Home Rule Act could be brought into immediate operation; and that the Cabinet had deputed to Mr. Lloyd George the task of negotiating to this end with both parties in Ireland.  Accordingly, Mr. Lloyd George, then Secretary of State for War, interviewed Sir Edward Carson on the one hand and Mr. Redmond and Mr. Devlin on the other, and submitted to them separately the proposals which he said the Cabinet were prepared to make.[93]

On the 6th of June Carson explained the Cabinet’s proposals at a special meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council held in private.  His task was an extremely difficult one, for the advice he had to offer was utterly detestable to himself, and he knew it would be no less so to his hearers.  And the latter, profound as was their trust in him as their leader, were men of singularly independent judgment and quite capable of respectfully declining to take any course they did not themselves approve.  Indeed, Carson emphasised the fact that he could not, and had not attempted to, bind the Council to take the same view of the situation as himself.  At the same time he clearly and frankly stated what his own opinion was, saying:  “I would indeed be a poor leader of a great movement if I hesitated to express my own views of any proposition put before you."[94]

His speech, which took nearly two hours in delivery, was a perfect model of lucid exposition and convincing argument.  He reviewed in close detail the course of events that had led to the present situation.  He maintained from first to last the highest ground of patriotism.  Mentioning that numerous correspondents had asked why he did not challenge the Nationalist professions of loyalty two years before at the beginning of the war, which had since then been so signally falsified, he answered: