But the Ulster Unionist Council had, meantime, been making inquiries on their own account.  There was nothing in the least improper, although the supporters of the Government tried to make out that there was, in the officers at the Curragh revealing what the Commander-in-Chief had said to them, so long as they did not communicate anything to the Press.  They were not, and could not be, pledged to secrecy.  It thus happened that it was possible for the Old Town Hall in Belfast to put together a more complete account of the whole affair than it suited the Government to reveal to Parliament.  On the 17th of April the Standing Committee issued to the Press a statement giving the main additional facts which a sworn inquiry would have elicited.  It bore the signatures of Lord Londonderry and Sir Edward Carson, and there can have been few foolhardy enough to suggest that these were men who would be likely to take such a step without first satisfying themselves as to the trustworthiness of the evidence, a point on which the judgment of one of them at all events was admittedly unrivalled.

From this statement it appeared that Sir Arthur Paget, so far from indicating that mere “precautionary measures” for the protection of Government stores were in contemplation, told his generals that preparations had been made for the employment of some 25,000 troops in Ulster, in conjunction with naval operations.  The gravity of the plan was revealed by the General’s use of the words “battles” and “the enemy,” and his statement that he would himself be “in the firing line” at the first “battle.”  He said that, when some casualties had been suffered by the troops, he intended to approach “the enemy” with a flag of truce and demand their surrender, and if this should be refused he would order an assault on their position.  The cavalry, whose pro-Ulster sentiments must have been well known to the Commander-in-Chief, were told that they would only be required to prevent the infantry “bumping into the enemy,” or in other words to act as a cavalry screen; that they would not be called upon to fire on “the enemy”; and that as soon as the infantry became engaged, they would be withdrawn and sent to Cork, where “a disturbance would be arranged” to provide a pretext for the movement.  A Military Governor of Belfast was to be appointed, and the general purpose of the operations was to blockade Ulster by land and sea, and to provoke the Ulster men to shed the first blood.

The publication of this statement with the authority of the two Ulster leaders created a tremendous sensation.  But it probably strengthened the resolution of the Government to refuse at all costs a judicial inquiry, which they knew would only supply sworn corroboration of the Ulster Unionist Council’s story.  In this they were assisted in an unexpected way.  Just when the pressure was at its highest, relief came by the diversion of attention and interest caused by another startling event in Ulster, which will be described in the following chapters.