[Footnote 325:  Jurien de la Graviere, vol. ii., p. 88, who says:  “His mild and melancholy disposition, his sad and modest behaviour, ill suited the Emperor’s ambitious plans.”]

[Footnote 326:  “Corresp.,” No. 8063.  See too No. 7996 for Napoleon’s plan of carrying a howitzer in the bows of his gun vessels so that his projectiles might burst in the wood.  Already at Boulogne he had uttered the prophetic words:  “We must have shells that will shiver the wooden sides of ships.”]

[Footnote 327:  James, “Naval History,” vol. iii., p. 213, and Chevalier, p. 115, imply that Villeneuve’s fleet from Toulon, after scouring the West Indies, was to rally the Rochefort force and cover the Boulogne flotilla:  but this finds no place in Napoleon’s September plan, which required Gantheaume first to land troops in Ireland and then convoy the flotilla across if the weather were favourable, or if it were stormy to beat down the Channel with the troops from Holland.  See O’Connor Morris, “Campaigns of Nelson,” p. 121.]

[Footnote 328:  Colomb, “Naval Warfare,” p. 18.]

[Footnote 329:  Jurien de la Graviere, vol. ii., p. 100.  Nelson was aware of the fallacies that crowded Napoleon’s brain:  “Bonaparte has often made his boast that our fleet would be worn out by keeping the sea, and that his was kept in order and increasing by staying in port; but he now finds, I fancy, if emperors hear truth, that his fleet suffers more in a night than ours in one year.”—­Nelson to Collingwood, March 13th, 1805.]

[Footnote 330:  Garden, “Traites,” vol. viii., pp. 276-290; also Capt.  Mahan, “Influence of Sea Power, etc.,” vol. ii., ch. xv. ad fin.  He quotes the opinion of a Spanish historian, Don Jose de Couto:  “If all the circumstances are properly weighed ... we shall see that all the charges made against England for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced to want of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect it.”—­In the Admiralty secret letters (1804-16) I have found the instructions to Sir J. Orde, with the Swiftsure, Polyphemus, Agamemnon, Ruby, Defence, Lively, and two sloops, to seize the treasure-ships.  No fight seems to have been expected.]

[Footnote 331:  “Corresp.,” No. 8379; Mahan, ibid., vol. ii., p. 149.]

[Footnote 332:  Letter of April 29th, 1805.  I cannot agree with Mahan (p. 155) that this was intended only to distract us.]

[Footnote 333:  “Lettres inedites de Talleyrand,” p. 121.]

[Footnote 334:  Jurien de la Graviere, vol. ii., p. 367.]

[Footnote 335:  Thiers writes, most disingenuously, as though Napoleon’s letters of August 13th and 22nd could have influenced Villeneuve.]

[Footnote 336:  Dupin, “Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne” (tome i., p. 244), who had the facts from Daru.  But, as Meneval sensibly says ("Mems.,” vol. i., ch. v.), it was not Napoleon’s habit dramatically to dictate his plans so far in advance.  Certainly, in military matters, he always kept his imagination subservient to facts.  Not until September 22nd, did he make any written official notes on the final moves of his chief corps; besides, the Austrians did not cross the Inn till September 8th.]