On the whole, I am compelled to dissent from Captain Mahan ("Influence of Sea Power,” vol. i., pp. 324-326), and to regard the larger schemes of Bonaparte in this Syrian enterprise as visionary.]

[Footnote 113:  Berthier, “Memoires”; Belliard, “Bourrienne et ses Erreurs,” also corrects Bourrienne.  As to the dearth of food, denied by Lanfrey, see Captain Krettly, “Souvenirs historiques.”]

[Footnote 114:  Emouf, “Le General Kleber,” p. 201.]

[Footnote 115:  “Admiralty Records,” Mediterranean, No. 19.]

[Footnote 116:  “Corresp.,” No. 4124; Lavalette, “Mems.,” ch. xxi.]

[Footnote 117:  Sidney Smith’s “Despatch to Nelson” of May 30th, 1799.]

[Footnote 118:  J. Miot’s words are:  “Mais s’il en faut croire cette voix publique, trop souvent organe de la verite tardive, qu’en vain les grands esperent enchainer, c’est un fait trop avere que quelques blesses du Mont Carmel et une grande partie des malades a l’hopital de Jaffa ont peri par les medicaments qui leur ont ete administres.”  Can this be called evidence?]

[Footnote 119:  Larrey, “Relation historique”; Lavalette, “Mems.,” ch. xxi.]

[Footnote 120:  See Belliard, “Bourrienne et ses Erreurs”; also a letter of d’Aure, formerly Intendant General of this army, to the “Journal des Debats” of April 16th, 1829, in reply to Bourrienne.]

[Footnote 121:  “On disait tout haut qu’il se sauvait lachement,” Merme in Guitry’s “L’Armee en Egypte.”  But Bonaparte had prepared for this discouragement and worse eventualities by warning Kleber in the letter of August 22nd, 1799, that if he lost 1,500 men by the plague he was free to treat for the evacuation of Egypt.]

[Footnote 122:  Lucien Bonaparte, “Memoires,” vol. ii., ch. xiv.]

[Footnote 123:  In our “Admiralty Records” (Mediterranean, No. 21) are documents which prove the reality of Russian designs on Corsica.]

[Footnote 124:  “Consid. sur la Rev. Francaise,” bk. iii., ch. xiii.  See too Sciout, “Le Directoire,” vol. iv., chs. xiii.-xiv.]

[Footnote 125:  La Reveilliere-Lepeaux, “Mems.,” vol. ii., ch. xliv.; Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., chs. vi.-vii.; Lavisse, “Rev. Francaise,” p. 394.]

[Footnote 126:  Barras, “Mems.,” vol. iv., ch. ii.]

[Footnote 127:  “Hist. of the United States” (1801-1813), by H. Adams, vol. i., ch. xiv., and Ste. Beuve’s “Talleyrand.”]

[Footnote 128:  Gohier, “Mems.,” vol. i.; Lavalette’s “Mems.,” ch. xxii.; Roederer, “OEuvres,” vol. iii., p. 301; Madelin’s “Fouche,” p. 267.]

[Footnote 129:  For the story about Arena’s dagger, raised against Bonaparte see Sciout, vol. iv., p. 652.  It seems due to Lucien Bonaparte.  I take the curious details about Bonaparte’s sudden pallor from Roederer ("Oeuvres,” vol. iii., p. 302), who heard it from Montrond, Talleyrand’s secretary.  So Aulard, “Hist, de la Rev. Fr.,” p. 699.]

[Footnote 130:  Napoleon explained to Metternich in 1812 why he wished to silence the Corps Legislatif; “In France everyone runs after applause:  they want to be noticed and applauded....  Silence an Assembly, which, if it is anything, must be deliberative, and you discredit it.”—­Metternich’s “Memoirs,” vol. i., p. 151.]