[Footnote 64:  “Corresp.,” October 21st, 1796.]

[Footnote 65:  “Corresp.,” October 24th, 1796.  The same policy was employed towards Genoa.  This republic was to be lulled into security until it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.]

[Footnote 66:  “Ordre du Jour,” November 7th, 1796.]

[Footnote 67:  Marmont, “Memoires,” vol. i., p. 237.  I have followed Marmont’s narrative, as that of the chief actor in this strange scene.  It is less dramatic than the usual account, as found in Thiers, and therefore is more probable.  The incident illustrates the folly of a commander doing the work of a sergeant.  Marmont points out that the best tactics would have been to send one division to cross the Adige at Albaredo, and so take Arcola in the rear.  Thiers’ criticism, that this would have involved too great a diffusion of the French line, is refuted by the fact that on the third day a move on that side induced the Austrians to evacuate Arcola.]

[Footnote 68:  Koch, “Memoires de Massena,” vol. i., p. 255, in his very complete account of the battle, gives the enemy’s losses as upwards of 2,000 killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners with 11 cannon.  Thiers gives 40,000 as Alvintzy’s force before the battle—­an impossible number.  See ante.]

[Footnote 69:  The Austrian official figures for the loss in the three days at Arcola give 2,046 killed and wounded, 4,090 prisoners, and 11 cannon.  Napoleon put it down as 13,000 in all!  See Schels in “Oest.  Milit.  Zeitschrift” for 1829.]

[Footnote 70:  A forecast of the plan realized in 1801-2, whereby Bonaparte gained Louisiana for a time.]

[Footnote 71:  Estimates of the Austrian force differ widely.  Bonaparte guessed it at 45,000, which is accepted by Thiers; Alison says 40,000; Thiebault opines that it was 75,000; Marmont gives the total as 26,217.  The Austrian official figures are 28,022 before the fighting north of Monte Baldo.  See my article in the “Eng.  Hist.  Review” for April, 1899.  I have largely followed the despatches of Colonel Graham, who was present at this battle.  As “J.G.” points out (op.cit. , p. 237), the French had 1,500 horse and some forty cannon, which gave them a great advantage over foes who could make no effective use of these arms.]

[Footnote 72:  This was doubtless facilitated by the death of the Czarina, Catherine II., in November, 1796.  She had been on the point of entering the Coalition against France.  The new Czar Paul was at that time for peace.  The Austrian Minister Thugut, on hearing of her death, exclaimed, “This is the climax of our disasters.”]

[Footnote 73:  Hueffer, “Oesterreich und Preussen,” p. 263.]

[Footnote 74:  “Moniteur,” 20 Floreal, Year V.; Sciout, “Le Directoire,” vol. ii., ch. vii.]

[Footnote 75:  See Landrieux’s letter on the subject in Koch’s “Memoires de Massena,” vol. ii.; “Pieces Justif.,” ad fin.; and Bonaparte’s “Corresp.,” letter of March 24th, 1797.  The evidence of this letter, as also of those of April 9th and 19th, is ignored by Thiers, whose account of Venetian affairs is misleading.  It is clear that Bonaparte contemplated partition long before the revolt of Brescia.]