[Footnote 28:  A letter of Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Trevor, at Turin ("F.  O. Records, Sardinia,” No. 13), states that he had the greatest difficulty in getting on with the French royalists:  “You must not send us one emigre of any sort—­they would be a nuisance:  they are all so various and so violent, whether for despotism, constitution, or republic, that we should be distracted with their quarrels; and they are so assuming, forward, dictatorial, and full of complaints, that no business could go on with them.  Lord Hood is averse to receiving any of them.”

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—­From the information which Mr. Spenser Wilkinson has recently supplied in his article in “The Owens College Hist.  Essays” (1902), it would seem that Buonaparte’s share in deciding the fate of Toulon was somewhat larger than has here been stated; for though the Commissioners saw the supreme need of attacking the fleet, they do not seem, as far as we know, to have perceived that the hill behind Fort L’Eguillette was the key of the position.  Buonaparte’s skill and tenacity certainly led to the capture of this height.]

[Footnote 29:  Jung, “Bonaparte et son Temps,” vol. ii., p. 430.]

[Footnote 30:  “Memorial,” ch. ii., November, 1815.  See also Thibaudeau, “Memoires sur le Consulat,” vol. i., p. 59.]

[Footnote 31:  Marmont (1774-1852) became sub-lieutenant in 1789, served with Buonaparte in Italy, Egypt, etc., received the title Duc de Ragusa in 1808, Marshal in 1809; was defeated by Wellington at Salamanca in 1812, deserted to the allies in 1814.  Junot (1771-1813) entered the army in 1791; was famed as a cavalry general in the wars 1796-1807; conquered Portugal in 1808, and received the title Duc d’Abrantes; died mad.]

[Footnote 32:  M. Zivy, “Le treize Vendemiaire,” pp.60-62, quotes the decree assigning the different commands.  A MS. written by Buonaparte, now in the French War Office Archives, proves also that it was Barras who gave the order to fetch the cannon from the Sablons camp.]

[Footnote 33:  Buonaparte afterwards asserted that it was he who had given the order to fire, and certainly delay was all in favour of his opponents.]

[Footnote 34:  I caution readers against accepting the statement of Carlyle ("French Revolution,” vol. iii. ad fin.) that “the thing we specifically call French Revolution is blown into space by the whiff of grapeshot.”  On the contrary, it was perpetuated, though in a more organic and more orderly governmental form.]

[Footnote 35:  Chaptal, “Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon,” p. 198.]

[Footntoe 36:  Koch, “Memoires de Massena,” vol. ii., p. 13, credits the French with only 37,775 men present with the colours, the Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with 20,000.  All these figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding communications.]

[Footnote 37:  Napoleon’s “Correspondence,” March 28th, 1796.]