What were Napoleon’s views on these questions?  It is difficult to follow the workings of his mind before the time when Caulaincourt’s despatch flashed the horrible truth upon him that he might, after all, leave France smaller and weaker than he found her.  Then the lightnings of his wrath flash forth, and we see the tumult and anguish of that mighty soul:  but previously the storm-wrack of passion and the cloud-bank of his clinging will are lit up by few gleams of the earlier piercing intelligence.  On January the 4th he had written to Caulaincourt that the policy of England and the personal rancour of the Czar would drag Austria along.  If Fortune betrayed him (Napoleon) he would give up the throne:  never would he sign any shameful peace.  But he added:  “You must see what Metternich wants:  it is not to Austria’s interest to push matters to the end.”  In the accompanying instructions to his plenipotentiary, he seems to assent to the Alpine and Rhenish frontiers, but advises him to sign the preliminaries as vaguely as possible, “as we have everything to gain by delay.”  The Rhine frontier must be so described as to leave France the Dutch fortresses:  and Savona and Spezzia must also count as on the French side of the Alps.  These, be it observed, are his notions when he has not heard of the defection of Murat, or the rejection of his Spanish bargain by the Cortes.

Twelve days later he proposes to Metternich an armistice, and again suggests that it is not to Austria’s interest to press matters too far.  But the allies are too wary to leave such a matter to Metternich:  at Teplitz they bound themselves to common action; and the proposal only shows them the need of pushing on fast while their foe is still unprepared.  Once more his old optimism asserts itself.  The first French success, that at Brienne, leads him to hope that the allies will now be ready to make peace.  Even after the disaster at La Rothiere, he believes that the mere arrival of Caulaincourt at the allied headquarters will foment the discords which there exist.[410] Then, writing amidst the unspeakable miseries at Troyes (February 4th), he upbraids Caulaincourt for worrying him about “powers and instructions when it is still doubtful if the enemy wants to negotiate.  His terms, it seems, are determined on beforehand.  As soon as you have them, you have the power to accept them or to refer them to me within twenty-four hours.”

After midnight, he again directs him to accept the terms, if acceptable:  “in the contrary case we will run the risks of a battle; even the loss of Paris, and all that will ensue.”  Later on that day he allows Maret to send a despatch giving Caulaincourt “carte blanche” to conclude peace.[411] But the plenipotentiary dared not take on himself the responsibility of accepting the terms offered by the allies two days later.  The last despatch was too vague to enable him to sign away many thousands of square miles of territory:  it contradicted the tenor of Napoleon’s letters, which empowered him to assent to nothing less than the Frankfurt terms.  And thus was to slip away one more chance of bringing about peace—­a peace that would strip the French Empire of frontier lands and alien peoples, but leave it to the peasants’ ruler, Napoleon.