latter motive was concealed, of course, but Lord Aberdeen gauged its power during a private interview that he had with Alexander at Freiburg (December 24th):  “He talked with great freedom:  he is more decided than ever as to the necessity of perseverance, and puts little trust in the fair promises of Bonaparte.—­’So long as he lives there can be no security’—­he repeated it two or three times."[391] We can therefore understand his concern lest the Frankfurt terms should be accepted outright by Napoleon.  Metternich, however, assured him that the French Emperor would not assent;[392] and, as in regard to the Prague Congress, he was substantially correct.

Here again we touch on the disputed question whether Metternich played a fair game against Napoleon, or whether he tempted him to play with loaded dice while his throne was at stake.  The latter supposition for a long time held the field; but it is untenable.  On several occasions the Austrian statesman warned Napoleon, or his trusty advisers, that the best course open to him was to sign peace at once.  He did so at Dresden, and he did so now.  On November 10th he sent Caulaincourt a letter, of which these are the most important sentences: 

" ...  M. de St. Aignan will speak to you of my conversations [with him].  I expect nothing from them, but I shall have done my duty.  France will never sign a more fortunate peace than that which the Powers will make to-day, and tomorrow if they have reverses.  New successes may extend their views....  I do not doubt that the approach of the allied armies to the frontiers of France may facilitate the formation of great armaments by her Government.  The questions will become problematical for the civilized world; but the Emperor Napoleon will not make peace.  There is my profession of faith, and I shall never be happier than if I am wrong.”

The letter rings true in every part.  Metternich made no secret of sending it, but allowed Lord Aberdeen to see it.[393] And by good fortune it reached Caulaincourt about the time when he assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.  Its substance must therefore have been known to Napoleon; and the tone of the Frankfurt proposals ought to have convinced him of the need of speedily making peace while Austria held out the olive branch from across the Rhine.  But Metternich’s gloomy forecast was only too true.  During his sojourn at Paris he had tested the rigidity of that cast-iron will.

In fact, no one who knew the Emperor’s devotion to Italy could believe that he would give up Piedmont and Liguria.  His own despatches show that he never contemplated such a surrender.  On November 20th he gave orders for the enrolling of 46,000 Frenchmen of mature age—­“not Italians or Belgians”—­who were to reinforce Eugene and help him to defend Italy; that, too, at a time when the defence of Champagne and Languedoc was about to devolve on lads of eighteen.