At once they turned eastwards towards Dresden; but so slow was their progress over the wretched cross-roads now cut up by the rains, that not till the early morning of the 25th did the heads of their columns appear on the heights south-west of the Saxon capital.  Yet, even so, the omens were all in their favour.  On their right, Wittgenstein had already carried the French lines at Pirna, and was now driving in St. Cyr’s outposts towards Dresden.  The daring spirits at Schwarzenberg’s headquarters therefore begged him to push on the advantage already gained, while Napoleon was still far away.  Everything, they asserted, proved that the French were surprised; Dresden could not long hold out against an attack by superior numbers:  its position in a river valley dominated by the southern and western slopes, which the allies strongly held, was fatal to a prolonged defence:  the thirteen redoubts hastily thrown up by the French could not long keep an army at bay, and of these only five were on the left side of the Elbe on which the allies were now encamped.

Against these manly counsels the voice of prudence pleaded for delay.  It was not known how strong were St. Cyr’s forces in Dresden and in the intrenched camp south of the city.  Would it not therefore be better to await the development of events?  Such was the advice of Toll and Moreau, the latter warning the Czar, with an earnestness which we may deem fraught with destiny for himself—­“Sire, if we attack, we shall lose 20,000 men and break our nose."[357] The multitude of counsellors did not tend to safety.  Distracted by the strife of tongues, Schwarzenberg finally took refuge in that last resort of weak minds, a tame compromise.  He decided to wait until further corps reached the front, and at four o’clock of the following afternoon to push forward five columns for a general reconnaissance in force.  As Jomini has pointed out, this plan rested on sheer confusion of thought.  If the commander meant merely to find out the strength of the defenders, that could be ascertained at once by sending forward light troops, screened by skirmishers, at the important points.  If he wished to attack in force, his movement was timed too late in the day safely to effect a lodgment in a large city held by a resolute foe.  Moreover, the postponement of the attack for thirty hours gave time for the French Emperor to appear on the scene with his Guards.

As we have seen, Napoleon reached Stolpen, a town distant some sixteen miles from Dresden, very early on the morning of the 25th.  His plans present a telling contrast to the slow and clumsy arrangements of the allies.  He proposed to hurl his Guards at their rear and cut them off from Bohemia.  Crossing the Elbe at Koenigstein, he would recover the camp of Pirna, hold the plateau further west and intercept Schwarzenberg’s retreat.[358] For the success of this plan he needed a day’s rest for his wearied Guards and the knowledge that Dresden could hold out for a short time.  His veterans could perhaps dispense with rest; where their Emperor went they would follow; but Dresden was the unknown quantity.  Shortly after midnight of the 25th and 26th, he heard from St. Cyr that Dresden would soon be attacked in such force that a successful defence was doubtful.