But Napoleon once more made the mistake of underrating both the numbers and the abilities of his foes.  By great exertions they now had close on half a million of men under arms, near the banks of the Oder and the Elbe, or advancing from Poland and Hungary.  True, many of these were reserves or raw recruits, and Colonel Cathcart doubted whether the Austrian reserves were then in existence.[344] But the best authorities place the total at 496,000 men and 1,443 cannon.  Moreover, as was agreed on at Trachenberg, 77,000 Russians and 49,000 Prussians now marched from Glatz and Schweidnitz into Bohemia, and speedily came into touch with the 110,000 Austrians now ranged behind the River Eger.  The formation of this allied Grand Army was a masterly step.  Napoleon did not hear of it before August 16th, and it was not until a week later that he realized how vast were the forces that would threaten his rear.  For the present his plan was to hold the Bohemian passes south of Bautzen and Pirna, so as to hinder any invasion of Saxony, while he threw himself in great force on the Army of Silesia, now 95,000 strong, though he believed it to number only 50,000.[345] While he was crushing Bluecher, his lieutenants, Oudinot, Reynier, and Bertrand, were charged to drive Bernadotte’s scattered corps from Berlin; whereupon Davoust was to cut him off from the sea and relieve the French garrisons at Stettin and Kuestrin.  Thus Napoleon proposed to act on the offensive in the open country towards Berlin and in Silesia, remaining at first on the defensive at Dresden and in the Lusatian mountains.  This was against the advice of Marmont, who urged him to strike first at Prague, and not to intrust his lieutenants with great undertakings far away from Dresden.  The advice proved to be sound; but it seems certain that Napoleon intended to open the campaign by a mighty blow dealt at Bluecher, and then to lead a great force through the Lusatian defiles into Bohemia and drive the allies before him towards Vienna.

But what did he presume that the allied forces in Bohemia would be doing while he overwhelmed Bluecher in Silesia?  Would not Dresden and his communications with France be left open to their blows?  He decided to run this risk.  He had 100,000 men among the Lusatian hills between Bautzen and Zittau.  St. Cyr’s corps was strongly posted at Pirna and the small fortress of Koenigstein, while his light troops watched the passes north of Teplitz and Karlsbad.  If the allies sought to invade Saxony, they would, so Napoleon thought, try to force the Zittau road, which presented few natural difficulties.  If they threatened Dresden by the passages further west, Vandamme would march from near Zittau to reinforce St. Cyr, or, if need be, the Emperor himself would hurry back from Silesia with his Guards.  If the enemy invaded Bavaria, Napoleon wished them bon voyage:  they would soon come back faster than they went; for, in that case, he would pour his columns down from