Substantially, this was the case.  Napoleon’s resentment against Austria, not unnatural under the circumstances, had hurried him into outbursts that revealed the inner fires of his passion.  In a second interview, on June 30th, he was far more gracious, and allowed Austria to hope that she would gain Illyria.  He also accepted Austria’s mediation; and it was stipulated that a Congress should meet at Prague for the discussion of a general pacification.  Metternich appeared highly pleased with this condescension, but he knew by experience that Napoleon’s caresses were as dangerous as his wrath; and he remained on his guard.  The Emperor soon disclosed his real aim.  In gracious tones he added:  “But this is not all:  I must have a prolongation of the armistice.  How can we between July 5th and 20th end a negotiation which ought to embrace the whole world?” He proposed August 20th as the date of its expiration.  To this Metternich demurred because the allies already thought the armistice too long for their interests.  August 10th was finally agreed on, but not without much opposition on the part of the allied generals, who insisted that such a prolongation would greatly embarrass them.

Outwardly, this new arrangement seemed to portend peace:  but it is significant that on June 28th Napoleon wrote to Eugene that all the probabilities appeared for war; and on June 30th he wrote his father-in-law a cold and almost threatening letter.[329]

Late on that very evening came to hand the first report of the disaster of Vittoria.  Despite all Napoleon’s precautions, the news leaked out at Dresden.  Bubna’s despatches of July 5th, 6th, and 7th soon made it known to the Emperor Francis, then at Brandeis in Bohemia.  Thence it reached the allied monarchs and Bernadotte on July 12th at Trachenberg in the midst of negotiations which will be described presently.  The effect of the news was very great.  The Czar at once ordered a Te Deum to be sung:  “It is the first instance,” wrote Cathcart, “of a Te Deum having been sung at this Court for a victory in which the forces of the Russian Empire were not engaged."[330] But its results were more than ceremonial:  they were practical.  Our envoy, Thornton, who followed Bernadotte to Trachenberg, states that Bubna had learnt that Wellington had completely routed three French corps with a debandade like that of the retreat from Moscow.  Thornton adds:  “The Prince Royal [Bernadotte] thinks that the French army will be very soon withdrawn from Silesia and that Buonaparte must soon commence his retreat nearer the Rhine.  I have no doubt of its effect upon Austria.  This is visible in the answer of the Emperor [Francis] to the Prince, which came to-day from the Austrian head-quarters.”  That letter, dated July 9th, was indeed of the most cordial character.  It expressed great pleasure at hearing that “the obstacles which seemed to hinder the co-operation of the forces under your Royal Highness