Alexander came there prejudiced against Metternich as a past master in the arts of double-dealing:  he went away convinced that he meant well for the allies.  “What will become of us,” asked the Czar, “if Napoleon accepts your mediation?” To which the statesman replied:  “If he refuses it, the truce will be at an end, and you will find us in the ranks of your allies.  If he accepts it, the negotiations will prove to a certainty that Napoleon is neither wise nor just; and the issue will be the same.”  Alexander knew enough of his great enemy’s character to discern the sagacity of Metternich’s forecast; and both Frederick William and he agreed to the Austrian terms.[324] Accordingly, on June 27th, a treaty was secretly signed at Reichenbach, wherein Austria pledged herself to an active alliance with Russia and Prussia in case Napoleon should not, by the end of the armistice, have acceded to her four conditiones sine quibus non. To these was now added a demand for the evacuation of all Polish and Prussian fortresses by French troops, a stipulation which it was practically certain that Napoleon would refuse.[325]

The allies meanwhile were gaining the sinews of war from England.  The Czar had informed Cathcart at Kalisch that, though he did not press our Government for subsidies, yet he would not be able to wage a long campaign without such aid.  On June 14th and 15th, our ambassador signed treaties with Russia and Prussia, whereby we agreed to aid the former by a yearly subsidy of L1,133,334, and the latter by a sum of half that amount, and to meet all the expenses of the Russian fleet then in our harbours.  The Czar and the King of Prussia bound themselves to maintain in the field (exclusive of garrisons) 160,000 and 80,000 men respectively.[326]

There was every reason for these preparations.  Everything showed that Napoleon was bent on browbeating the allies.  On June 17th Napoleon’s troops destroyed or captured Luetzow’s volunteers at Kitzen near Leipzig.  The excuse for this act was that Luetzow had violated the armistice; but he had satisfied Nisas, the French officer there in command, that he was loyally observing it.  Nevertheless, his brigade was cut to pieces.  The protests of the allies received no response except that Luetzow’s men might be exchanged—­as if they had been captured in fair fight.  Finally, Napoleon refused to hear the statement of Nisas in his own justification, reproached him for casting a slur on the conduct of French troops, and deprived him of his command.[327]

But it was Napoleon’s bearing towards Metternich, in an interview held on June 26th at the Marcolini Palace at Dresden, that most clearly revealed the inflexibility of his policy.  Ostensibly, the interview was fixed in order to arrange the forms of the forthcoming Congress that was to insure the world’s peace.  In reality, however, Napoleon hoped to intimidate the Austrian statesman, and to gather from him the results of his recent interview with the Czar.