Such was his first plan.  It was upset by the rapidity of the Cossacks and the general uprising of Prussia.  Augereau’s corps was driven from Berlin by a force of Cossacks led by Tettenborn; and this daring free lance, a native of Hamburg, thereupon made a dash for the liberation of his city.  For the time he was completely successful:  the fury of the citizens against the French douaniers gave the Cossacks and patriots an easy triumph there and throughout Hanover.  This news caused Napoleon grave concern.  The loss of the great Hanse Town opened a wide door for English goods, English money, and English troops into Germany.  It must be closed at all costs:  and, with severe rebukes to Eugene and Lauriston, who were now holding the line of the middle Elbe, he charged Davoust (March 18th) to hold the long winding course of that river between Magdeburg and Hamburg.  The advance of this determined leader was soon to change the face of affairs in North Germany.

Shortly before Napoleon left Paris for the seat of war, he received the new Austrian ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg (April 9th).  With a jocular courtesy that veiled the deepest irony, he complimented him on having waged a fine campaign in 1812.  Austria’s present requests were not reassuring.  While professing the utmost regard for the welfare of Napoleon, she renewed her offer of mediation in a more pressing way.  In fact, Metternich’s aim now was to free Austria from the threatening pressure of Napoleon on the west and of Russia on the east.  She must now assure to Europe a lasting peace—­“not a mere truce in disguise, like all former treaties with Napoleon”—­but a peace that would restrict the power of France and “establish a balance of power among the chief States."[289] Such was the secret aim of Austria’s mediation.  Obviously, it gave her many advantages.  While posing as mediator, she could claim her share in the territorial redistribution which must accompany the peace.  The blessing awarded to the peacemaker must be tangible and immediate.

Napoleon’s reply to the ambassador was carefully guarded.  War was not to his interest.  It would cost more blood than the Moscow campaign.  The great hindrance to any settlement would be England.  Russia also seemed disposed to a fight a outrance; but if the Czar wanted peace, it was for him, not for France, to take the initiative:  “I cannot take the initiative:  that would be like capitulating as if I were in a fort:  it is for the others to send me their proposals.”  And he expressed his resolve to accept no disadvantageous terms in these notable words:  “If I concluded a dishonourable peace, it would be my overthrow.  I am a new man; I must pay the more heed to public opinion, because I stand in need of it.  The French have lively imaginations:  they love fame and excitement, and are nervous.  Do you know the prime cause of the fall of the Bourbons?  It dates from Rossbach.”  Benevolent assurances as to Napoleon’s desire for peace and for the assembly of a Congress were all that Schwarzenberg could gain; and his mission was barren of result, except to increase suspicions on both sides.