The feelings of the soldiery also forbade a spiritless abandonment of the holy city of the Upper Dnieper that stands as sentinel to Russia Proper.  On these feelings Napoleon counted, and rightly.  He was now in no haste to strike:  the blow must be crushing and final.  At last he hears that Davoust, the leader whose devotion and methodical persistence merit his complete trust, has bridged the River Dnieper below the city, and has built ovens for supplying the host with bread.  And having now drawn up troops and supplies from the rear, he pushes on to end the campaign.

Barclay was still for retreat; but religious sentiment and patriotism bade the defenders stand firm behind those crumbling walls, while Bagration secured the line of retreat.  The French, ranged around on the low hills which ring it on the south, looked for an easy triumph, and Napoleon seems to have felt an excess of confidence.  At any rate, his dispositions were far from masterly.  He made no serious effort to threaten the Russian communications with Moscow, nor did he wait for his artillery to overwhelm the ramparts and their defenders.  The corps of Ney, Davoust, and Poniatowski, with Murat’s cavalry and the Imperial Guard posted in reserve, promised an easy victory, and the dense columns of foot moved eagerly to the assault.  They were received with a terrific fire.  Only after three hours’ desperate fighting did they master the southern suburbs, and at nightfall the walls still defied their assaults.  Yet in the meantime Napoleon’s cannon had done their work.  The wooden houses were everywhere on fire; a speedy retreat alone could save the garrison from ruin; and amidst a whirlwind of flame and smoke Barclay drew off his men to join Bagration on the road to Moscow (August 17th).

Once more, then, the Russian army had slipped from Napoleon’s grasp, though this time it dealt him a loss of 12,000 in killed or wounded.  And the momentous question faced him whether he should halt, now that summer was on the wane, or snatch under the walls of Moscow the triumph which Vilna, Vitepsk, and Smolensk had promised and denied.  It is stated by that melodramatic narrator, Count Philip Segur, that on entering Vitepsk, the Emperor exclaimed:  “The campaign of 1812 is ended, that of 1813 will do the rest.”  But the whole of Napoleon’s “Correspondence” refutes the anecdote.  Besides, it was not Napoleon’s habit to go into winter quarters in July, or to rest before he had defeated the enemy’s main army.[264]

At Smolensk the question wore another aspect.  Napoleon told Metternich at Dresden that he would not in the present year advance beyond Smolensk, but would organize Lithuania during winter and advance again in the spring of 1813, adding:  “My enterprise is one of those of which the solution is to be found in patience.”  A policy of masterly inactivity certainly commended itself to his Marshals.  But the desire to crush the enemy’s rear drew Ney and Murat into a sharp affair at Valutino or Lubino: