Then there was the open sore of Poland.  The challenge, on this subject, was flung down by Napoleon at a diplomatic reception on his birthday, August 15th, 1811.  Addressing the Russian envoy, he exclaimed:  “I am not so stupid as to think that it is Oldenburg which troubles you.  I see that Poland is the question:  you attribute to me designs in favour of Poland.  I begin to think that you wish to seize it.  No:  if your army were encamped on Montmartre, I would not cede an inch of the Warsaw territory, not a village, not a windmill.”  His fears as to Russia’s designs were far-fetched.  Alexander’s sounding of the Poles was a defensive measure, seriously undertaken only after Napoleon’s refusal to discourage the Polish nationalists.  But it suited the French Emperor to aver that the quarrel was about Poland rather than the Continental System, and the scene just described is a good specimen of his habit of cool calculation even in seemingly chance outbursts of temper.  His rhapsody gained him the ardent support of the Poles, and was vague enough to cause no great alarm to Austria and Prussia.[252]

On the next day Napoleon sketched to his Ministers the general plan of campaign against Russia.  The whole of the Continent was to be embattled against her.  On the Hapsburg alliance he might well rely.  But the conduct of Prussia gave him some concern.  For a time she seemed about to risk a war a outrance, such as Stein, Fichte, and the staunch patriots of the Tugendbund ardently craved.  Indeed, Napoleon’s threats to this hapless realm seemed for a time to portend its annihilation.  The King, therefore, sent Scharnhorst first to St. Petersburg and then to Vienna with secret overtures for an alliance.  They were virtually refused.  Prudence was in the ascendant at both capitals; and, as will presently appear, the more sagacious Prussians soon came to see that a war, in which Napoleon could be enticed into the heart of Russia, might deal a mortal blow at his overgrown Empire.  Certainly it was quite impossible for Prussia to stay the French advance.  A guerilla warfare, such as throve in Spain, must surely be crushed in her open plains; and the diffident King returned Gneisenau’s plan of a rising of the Prussian people against Napoleon with the chilling comment, “Very good as poetry.”

Thus, when Napoleon wound up his diplomatic threats by an imperious summons to side with him or against him, Frederick William was fain to abide by his terms, sending 20,000 troops against Russia, granting free passage to Napoleon’s army, and furnishing immense supplies of food and forage, the payment of which was to be settled by some future arrangement (February, 1812).  These conditions seemed to thrust Prussia down to the lowest circle of the Napoleonic Inferno; and great was the indignation of her patriots.  They saw not that only by stooping before the western blast could Prussia be saved.  To this topic we shall recur presently, when we treat of the Russian plan of campaign.