Meanwhile, at the other extremity of Europe, events were transpiring that served as the best excuse for our harshness towards Denmark.  Even before our fleet sailed for the Sound, Napoleon was weaving his plans for the destruction of Portugal.  It is clear that he designed to strike her first before taking any action against Denmark.  During his return journey from Tilsit to Paris, he directed Talleyrand to send orders to Lisbon for the closing of all Portuguese ports against British goods by September the 1st—­“in default of which I declare war on Portugal.”  He also ordered the massing of 20,000 French troops at Bayonne in readiness to join the Spanish forces that were to threaten the little kingdom.[167]

What crime had Portugal committed?  She had of late been singularly passive:  anxiously she looked on at the gigantic strifes that were engulfing the smaller States one by one.  Her conduct towards Napoleon had been far less provocative than that of Denmark towards England.  Threatened with partition by him and Spain in 1801, she had eagerly snatched at peace, and on the rupture of the Peace of Amiens was fain to purchase her neutrality at the cost of a heavy subsidy to France, which she still paid in the hope of prolonging her “existence on sufferance."[168] That hope now faded away.

As far back as February, 1806, Napoleon had lent a ready ear to the plans which Godoy, the all-powerful Minister at Madrid, had proposed for the partition of Portugal; and, in the month of July following, Talleyrand held out to our plenipotentiary at Paris the threat that, unless England speedily made peace with France, Napoleon would annex Switzerland—­“but still less can we alter, for any other consideration, our intention of invading Portugal.  The army destined for that purpose is already assembling at Bayonne.”  A year’s respite was gained for the House of Braganza by the campaigns of Jena and Friedland.  But now, with the tenacity of his nature, the Emperor returned to the plan, actually tried in 1801 and prepared for in 1806, of crushing our faithful ally in order to compel us to make peace.  On this occasion he counted on certain success, as may be seen by the following extract from the despatch of the Portuguese ambassador at Paris to his Government: 

“On Sunday afternoon [August 2nd] there was a diplomatic Levee.  The Emperor came up to me as I stood in the circle, and in a low voice said:  ’Have you written to your Court?  Have you despatched a courier with my final determination?’—­I replied in the affirmative.—­’Very well,’ said the Emperor, ’then by this time your Court knows that she must break with England before the 1st of September.  It is the only way to accelerate peace.’—­As the place did not permit discussion on my part, I answered:  ’I should think, Sire, that England must now be sincerely anxious to make peace.’—­’Oh,’ replied the Emperor, ’we are very certain of that:  however, in all cases, you must break either with England or France before the 1st of September.’—­He then turned about and addressed himself to the Danish Minister, as far as I could judge to the same purport."[169]

Equally confident is Napoleon’s tone in the lately published letter of September 7th: