“Denmark’s safety,” he wrote on July 16th, “is to be found, under the present circumstances of the world, only in a balance of opposite dangers.  For it is not to be disguised that the influence which France has acquired from recent events over the North of Europe, might, unless balanced by the naval power of Great Britain, leave to Denmark no other option than that of compliance with the demands of Bonaparte."[162]

A balance of opposite dangers! In this phrase Canning summed up his policy towards Denmark.  Threatened by Napoleon on the land, she was to be threatened by us from the sea; and Canning hoped that these opposite forces would, at least, secure Danish neutrality, without which Sweden must succumb in her struggle against France.  That some compulsion would be needed had long been clear.  In fact, the use of compulsion had first been recommended by the Russian and Prussian Governments, which had gone so far as to include in the Treaty of Bartenstein a proposal of common action, along with England, Austria and Sweden, to compel Denmark to side with the allies against Napoleon.[163] To this resolve England still clung, despite the defection of the Czar.  In truth, his present conduct made the case for the coercion of Denmark infinitely more urgent.

As to the reality of Napoleon’s designs on Denmark, there can be no doubt.  After his return to France, he wrote from St. Cloud, directing Talleyrand to express his displeasure that Denmark had not fulfilled her promises:  “Whatever my desire to treat Denmark well, I cannot hinder her suffering from having allowed the Baltic to be violated [by the English expedition to Stralsund]; and, if England refuses Russia’s mediation, Denmark must choose either to make war against England, or against me."[164] Whence it is clear that Denmark had given Napoleon grounds for hoping that she would declare the Baltic a mare clausum.

The British Government had so far fathomed these designs as to see the urgency of the danger.  Accordingly it proposed to Denmark a secret defensive alliance, the chief terms of which were the handing over of the Danish fleet, to be kept as a “sacred pledge” by us till the peace, a subsidy of L100,000 paid to Denmark for that fleet, and the offer of armed assistance in case she should be attacked by France.  This offer of defensive alliance was repulsed, and the Danish Prince Royal determined to resist even the mighty armada which was now nearing his shores.  Towards the close of August, eighty-eight British ships were in the Sound and the Belt; and when the transports from Ruegen and Stralsund joined those from Yarmouth, as many as 15,400 troops were at hand, under the command of Lord Cathcart.  A landing was effected near Copenhagen, and offers of alliance were again made, including the deposit of the Danish fleet; “but if this offer is rejected now, it cannot be repeated.  The captured property, public and private, must then