It was in this spirit that he surveyed the Polish Question.  Arising out of the partitions of that unhappy land by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, it had distracted the repose of Europe scarcely less than the French Revolution; and now the heir to the Revolution, after hewing his way through the weak monarchies of Central Europe, was about to probe this ulcer of Christendom.  As usual, nothing had been done to forestall him.  Czartoryski had begged Alexander to declare Russian Poland an autonomous kingdom united with Russia only by the golden link of the crown, but this timely proposal was rejected;[121] and the Czar displayed the weakness of his judgment and the strength of his vanity by plunging into war with Turkey and Persia, at a time when Poland was opening her arms to the victor of a hundred fights.  It was, therefore, easy for Napoleon to surround Russia with foes; and, as will shortly appear, he took steps to invigorate even the remote Persian Empire.

But, above all, he spurred on the Poles to take up arms.  His encouragements were discreetly vague.  True, he countenanced Polish proclamations, which spoke grandiloquently of national liberty; but proclamations he ever viewed as the ballons d’essai of politics.  He also warned Murat not to promise the Poles too much:  “My greatness does not depend on the aid of a few thousand Poles.  Let them show a firm resolve to be independent:  let them pledge themselves to support the King that will be given to them, and then I will see what is to be done.”

There were two reasons for this caution.  His Marshals found no very general disposition among the Poles to take up arms for France; and he desired not to offend Austria by revolutionizing Galicia and her districts south and east of Warsaw.  Already the Hapsburgs were nervously mustering their troops, and Napoleon had no wish to tempt fortune by warring against three Powers a thousand miles away from his own frontiers.  He therefore calmed the Court of Vienna by promising that he would discourage any rising in Austrian Poland, and he held forth the prospect of regaining Silesia.  This tempting offer was made secretly and conditionally; and evoked no expression of thanks, but rather a redoubling of precautions.  Yet, despite the efforts of England and Russia, the Hapsburg ruler refused to join the allies:  he preferred to play the waiting game which had ruined Prussia.[122]

The campaign was reopened amidst terrible weather by a daring move of Bennigsen’s Russians westwards, in the hope of saving Danzig and Graudenz from the French.  At first a screen of forests well concealed his advance.  But, falling in with Bernadotte near the River Passarge, his progress was checked and his design revealed.  At once Napoleon prepared to march northwards and throw the Russians into the sea, a plan which in its turn was foiled by the seizure of a French despatch by Cossacks.  Bennigsen, now aware of his danger, at once retreated towards