On the other hand, Napoleon, as Protector of the Rhenish Confederation, secured the aid of 25,000 South Germans, as well as an excellent fortified base at Wuerzburg.  His troops, holding the citadels of Passau and Braunau on the Austrian frontier, kept the Hapsburgs quiet; and 60,000 French and Dutch troops at Wesel menaced the Prussians in Hanover.  Above all, his forces already in Germany were strengthened until, in the early days of October, some 200,000 men were marching from the Main towards the Duchy of Weimar.  Soult and Ney led 60,000 men from Amberg towards Baireuth and Hof:  Bernadotte and Davoust, with 90,000, marched towards Schleitz, while Lannes and Augereau, with 46,000, moved by a road further to the left towards Saalfeld.

The progress of these dense columns near together and through a hilly country presented great difficulties, which only the experience of the officers, the energy and patience of the men, and the genius of their great leader could overcome.  Meanwhile Napoleon had quietly left Paris on September 25th.  Travelling at his usual rapid rate, he reached Mainz on the 28th:  he was at Wuerzburg on October 2nd; there he directed the operations, confident that the impact of his immense force would speedily break the Prussians, drive them down the valley of the Saale and thus detach the Elector of Saxony from an alliance that already was irksome.

The French, therefore, had a vast mass of seasoned fighters, a good base of operations, and a clear plan of attack.  The Prussians, on the contrary, could muster barely 128,000 men, including the Saxons, for service in the field; and of these 27,000 with Ruechel were on the frontier of Hesse-Cassel seeking to assure the alliance of the Elector.  The commander-in-chief was the septuagenarian Duke of Brunswick, well known for his failure at Valmy in 1792 and his recent support to the policy of complaisance to France.  His appointment aroused anger and consternation; and General Kalckreuth expressed to Gentz the general opinion when he said that the Duke was quite incompetent for such a command:  “His character is not strong enough, his mediocrity, irresolution, and untrustworthiness would ruin the best undertaking.”  The Duke himself was aware of his incompetence.  Why then, we ask, did he accept the command?  The answer is startling; but it rests on the evidence of General von Mueffling: 

“The Duke of Brunswick had accepted the command in order to avert war.  I can affirm this with perfect certainty, since I have heard it from his own lips more than once.  He was fully aware of the weaknesses of the Prussian army and the incompetence of its officers."[102]

Thus there was seen the strange sight of a diffident, peace-loving King accompanying the army and sharing in all the deliberations; while these were nominally presided over by a despondent old man who still intrigued to preserve peace, and shifted on to the King the