Among his errors of judgment, assuredly his behaviour to Austria in 1805 was not the least.  The recent history of Europe supplies a suggestive contrast.  Two generations after Austerlitz, the Hapsburg Power was shattered by the disaster of Koeniggraetz, and once more lost all influence in Germany and Italy.  But the victor then showed consideration for the vanquished.  Bismarck had pondered over the lessons of history, because, as he said, history teaches one how far one may safely go.  He therefore persuaded King William to forego claims that would have embittered the rivalry of Prussia and Austria.  Nay! he recurred to Talleyrand’s policy of encouraging the Hapsburgs to seek in the Balkan Peninsula compensation for their losses in the west:  and within fifteen years the basis of the Triple Alliance was firmly laid.  Napoleon, on the other hand, for lack of that statesmanlike moderation which consecrates victory and cements the fabric of an enduring Empire, soon saw the political results of Austerlitz swept away by the rising tide of the nations’ wrath.  In less than nine years the Austrians and their allies were masters of Paris.

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—­The account given on p. 41 of the drowning of numbers of Russians at the close of the Battle of Austerlitz was founded upon the testimony of Napoleon and many French generals; the facts, as related by Lejeune, seemed quite convincing; the Czar Alexander also asserted at Vienna in 1815 that 20,000 Russians had been drowned there.  But the local evidence (kindly furnished to me by Professor Fournier of Vienna) seems to prove that the story is a myth.  Both lakes were drained only a few days after the battle, at Napoleon’s orders; in the lower lake not a single corpse was found; in the upper lake 150 corpses of horses, but only two, some say three, of men, were found.  Probably Napoleon invented the catastrophe for the sake of dramatic effect, and others followed the lead given in his bulletin.  The Czar may have adopted the story because it helped to excuse his defeat. (See my article in the “Eng.  Hist.  Rev.” for July, 1902.)

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CHAPTER XXIV

PRUSSIA AND THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE

An eminent German historian, who has striven to say some kind words about Frederick William’s Government before the collapse at Jena, prefaces his apology by the axiom that from a Prussian monarch one ought to expect, not French, English, or Russian policy, but only Prussian policy.  The claim may well be challenged.  Doubtless, there are some States concerning which it would be true.  Countries such as Great Britain and Spain, whose areas are clearly defined by nature, may with advantage be self-contained until their peoples overflow into new lands:  before they become world Powers, they may gain in strength by being narrowly national.  But there are other States whose fortunes are widely different.  They represent some principle of life or energy, in the midst of mere political wreckage.  If the binding power, which built up an older organism, should decline, as happened to the Holy Roman Empire after the religious wars, fragments will fall away and join bodies to which they are now more akin.