The word truce now spelt guile; its offer through Savary, whose hands were stained with the blood of the Duc d’Enghien, was in itself an insult, and Alexander gave that envoy the coolest reception.  In return he sent Prince Dolgoruki, the leader of the bellicose youths now high in favour, who proudly declared to the French Emperor the wishes of his master for the independence of Europe—­adding among other things that Holland must be free and have Belgium added to it.

This suggestion greatly amused Napoleon, who replied that Russia ought now to think of her own advantages on the side of Turkey.  The answer convinced the Czar that Napoleon dreaded a conflict in his dangerously advanced position.  He knew not his antagonist’s resources.  Napoleon had hurried up every available regiment.  Bernadotte’s corps was recalled from the frontier of Bohemia; Friant’s division of 4,000 men was ordered up from Pressburg; and by forced marches it also was nigh at hand on the night of December 1st, worn with fatigue after covering an immense space in two days, but ready to do excellent service on the morrow.[41] By this timely concentration Napoleon raised his forces to a total of at least 73,000 men, while the enemy founded their plan on the assumption that Napoleon had less than 50,000, and would scarcely resist the onset of superior forces.

Their plan was rash, even for an army which numbered about 80,000 men.  The Austrian General Weyrother had convinced the Czar that an energetic advance of his left wing, which rested on the southern spurs of the Pratzenberg, would force back Napoleon’s right, which was ranged between the villages of Kobelnitz and Sokelnitz, and so roll up his long line that stretched beyond Schlapanitz.  This move, if successful, would not only win the day, but decide the campaign, by cutting off the French from their supplies coming from the south and driving them into the exhausted lands around Olmuetz.  Such was Weyrother’s scheme, which enchanted the Czar and moved the fears of the veteran Kutusoff:  it was expounded to the Russian and Austrian generals after midnight on December the 2nd.  Strong in the great central hill, the Pratzenberg, and the cover of its village at the foot, the Czar had no fear for his centre:  to his right or northern wing he gave still less heed, as it rested firmly on villages and was powerful in cavalry and artillery; but his left wing, comprising fully two-fifths of the allied army, was expected easily to defeat Napoleon’s weak and scattered right, and so decide the day.  Kutusoff saw the peril of massing so great a force there and weakening the centre, but sadly held his peace.