as inevitable, but wished to temporize for some three months or so, until certain matters were cleared up; they therefore cautiously sounded the position at Vienna and London.  This passage from Czartoryski (vol. ii., ch. iii.) proves that Russia wanted the English alliance: 

“After the diplomatic rupture consequent upon the execution of the Duc d’Enghien, it became indispensable to come to an understanding with the only Power, except Russia, which thought herself strong enough to contend with France—­to ascertain as thoroughly as possible what were her inclinations and designs, the principles of her policy, and those which she could be led to adopt in certain contingencies.  It would have been a great advantage to obtain the concurrence in our views of so powerful a State as England, and to strive with her for the same objects; but for this it was necessary, not only to make sure of her present inclinations, but to weigh well the possibilities of the future after the death of George III. and the fall of the Pitt Ministry.  We had to make England understand that the wish to fight Napoleon was not in itself sufficient to establish an indissoluble bond between her Government and that of St. Petersburg....”

In “F.O.,” Russia, No. 55, is a despatch of our ambassador at St. Petersburg, Admiral Warren, of June 30, 1804, in which he reports Czartoryski’s concern at rumours of negotiations between England and France:  “The prince [Czartoryski] remarked that he could not suppose, after what had passed between the two Courts, and the manner in which the Emperor [Alexander] had explained himself to England, and after the measures which Russia had since proposed, that Great Britain would make a peace at once by herself.”

Of these earlier negotiations I have found no trace; but obviously the first proposals for an alliance must have come from Russia.  Sweden was the first to propose a monarchical league against Napoleon. (See my article in the “Revue Napoleonienne” for June, 1902.)

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CHAPTER XXIII

AUSTERLITZ

After the capitulation of Ulm, the French Emperor marched against the Russian army, which, as he told his troops, English gold had brought from the ends of the earth. As is generally the case with coalitions, neither of the allies was ready in time or sent its full quota.  In place of the 54,000 which Alexander had covenanted to send to Austria’s support, he sent as yet only 46,000; and of these 8,000 were detached into Podolia in order to watch the warlike moves of the Turks, whom the French had stirred up against the Muscovite.