The Czar, too, was far from eager for war.  He had sent Novossiltzoff to Berlin en route for Paris, in the hope of coming to terms with Napoleon, when the news of the annexation of Genoa ended the last hopes of a compromise.  “This man is insatiable,” exclaimed Alexander; “his ambition knows no bounds; he is a scourge of the world; he wants war; well, he shall have it, and the sooner the better,” The Czar at once ordered all negotiations to be broken off.  Novossiltzoff, on July 10th, declared to Baron Hardenberg, the successor of Haugwitz at the Prussian Foreign Office, that Napoleon had now passed the utmost limits of the Czar’s patience; and he at once returned his French passports.  In forwarding them to the French ambassador at Berlin, Hardenberg expressed the deep regret of the Prussian monarch at the breakdown of this most salutary negotiation—­a phrase which showed that the patience of Berlin was nearly exhausted.[20]

Clearly, then, the Third Coalition was not cemented by English gold, but by Napoleon’s provocations.  While England and Russia found great difficulty in coming to an accord, and Austria was arming only from fear, the least act of complaisance on his part would have unravelled this ill-knit confederacy.  But no such action was forthcoming.  All his letters written in North Italy after his coronation are puffed up with incredible insolence.  Along with hints to Eugene to base politics on dissimulation and to seek only to be feared, we find letters to Ministers at Paris scorning the idea that England and Russia can come to terms, and asserting that the annexation of Genoa concerns England alone; but if Austria wants to find a pretext for war, she may now find it.

Then he hurries back to Fontainebleau, covering the distance from Turin in eighty-five hours; and, after a brief sojourn at St. Cloud, he reaches Boulogne.  There, on August the 22nd, he hears that Austria is continuing to arm:  a few hours later comes the news that Villeneuve has turned back to Cadiz.  Fiercely and trenchantly he resolves this fateful problem.  He then sketches to Talleyrand the outlines of his new policy.  He will again press, and this time most earnestly, his offer of Hanover to Prussia as the price of her effective alliance against the new coalition.  Perhaps this new alliance will strangle the coalition at its birth; at any rate it will paralyze Austria.  Accordingly, he despatches to Berlin his favourite aide-de-camp, General Duroc, to persuade the King that his alliance will save the Continent from war.[21]

Meanwhile the Hapsburgs were completely deceived.  They imagined Napoleon to be wholly immersed in his naval enterprise, and accordingly formed a plan of campaign, which, though admirable against a weak and guileless foe, was fraught with danger if the python’s coils were ready for a spring.  As a matter of fact, he was far better prepared than Austria.  As late as July 7th, the Court of Vienna had informed the allies that its army would not be ready for four months; yet the nervous anxiety of the Hapsburgs to be beforehand with Napoleon led them to hurry on war:  and on August 9th they secretly gave their adhesion to the Russo-British alliance.