If ever Napoleon intended risking all his fortunes on the conquest of England, it can be proved that his mind was gradually cleared of illusions.  He trusted that a popular rising would overthrow the British Government:  people and rulers showed an accord that had never been known since the reign of Queen Anne.  He believed, for a short space, that the flotilla could fight sea-going ships out at sea:  the converse was proved up to the hilt.  Finally, he trusted that Villeneuve, when burdened with Spanish ships, would outwit and outmanoeuvre Nelson!

What then remained after these and many other disappointments?  Surely that scheme alone was practicable, in which the command of the sea formed only an unimportant factor.  For the conquest of England it was an essential factor.  In Ireland alone could Napoleon find the conditions on which he counted for success—­a discontented populace that would throng to the French eagles, and a field of warfare where the mere landing of 20,000 veterans would decide the campaign.[340]

And yet it is, on the whole, certain that his expedition for Ireland was meant merely to distract and paralyze the defenders of Great Britain, while he dealt the chief blow at London.  Instinct and conviction alike prompted him to make imposing feints that should lead his enemy to lay bare his heart, and that heart was our great capital.  His indomitable will scorned the word impossible—­“a word found only in the dictionary of fools”; he felt England to be the sole barrier to his ambitions; and to crush her power he was ready to brave, not only her stoutest seamen, but also her guardian angels, the winds and storms.  Both the man and the occasion were unique in the world’s history and must not be judged according to tame probabilities.  For his honour was at stake.  He was so deeply pledged to make use of the vast preparations at his northern ports that, had all his complex dispositions worked smoothly, he would certainly have attempted a dash at London; and only after some adequate excuse could he consent to give up that adventure.

The excuse was now furnished by Villeneuve’s retreat to Cadiz; and public opinion, ignorant of Napoleon’s latest instructions on that subject, and knowing only the salient facts of the case, laid on that luckless admiral the whole burden of blame for the failure of the scheme of invasion.  With front unabashed and a mind presaging certain triumphs, Napoleon accordingly wheeled his legions eastward to prosecute that alluring alternative, the conquest of England through the Continent.

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APPENDIX

[The two following State Papers have never before been published]

No.  I. is a despatch from Mr. Thornton, our charge d’affaires at Washington, relative to the expected transfer of the vast region of Louisiana from Spain to France (see ch. xv. of this vol.).