All these advantages were to a large extent realized.  Though the Czar had been the first to suggest our retention of Malta, he now began to waver.  The clearness and precision of Talleyrand’s notes, and the telling charge of perfidy against England, made an impression which the cumbrous retorts of Lord Hawkesbury and the sailor-like diplomacy of Admiral Warren failed to efface.[254] And the Russian Chancellor, Vorontzoff, though friendly to England, and desirous of seeing her firmly established at Malta, now began to complain of the want of clearness in her policy.  The Czar emphasized this complaint, and suggested that, as Malta could not be the real cause of dispute, the British Government should formulate distinctly its grievances and so set the matter in train for a settlement.  The suggestion was not complied with.  To draw up a long list of complaints, some drawn from secret sources and exposing the First Consul’s schemes, would have exasperated his already ruffled temper; and the proposal can only be regarded as an adroit means of justifying Alexander’s sudden change of front.

Meanwhile events had proceeded apace at Paris.  On April 26th Joseph Bonaparte made a last effort to bend his brother’s will, but only gained the grudging concession that Napoleon would never consent to the British retention of Malta for a longer time than three or four years.  As this would have enabled him to postpone the rupture long enough to mature his oriental plans, it was rejected by Lord Whitworth, who insisted on ten years as the minimum.  The evident determination of the British Government speedily to terminate the affair, one way or the other, threw Napoleon into a paroxysm of passion; and at the diplomatic reception of May 1st, from which Lord Whitworth discreetly absented himself, he vehemently inveighed against its conduct.  Fretted by the absence of our ambassador, for whom this sally had been intended, he returned to St. Cloud, and there dictated this curious epistle to Talleyrand: 

“I desire that your conference [with Lord Whitworth] shall not degenerate into a conversation.  Show yourself cold, reserved, and even somewhat proud.  If the [British] note contains the word ultimatum make him feel that this word implies war; if it does not contain this word, make him insert it, remarking to him that we must know where we are, that we are tired of this state of anxiety....  Soften down a little at the end of the conference, and invite him to return before writing to his Court.”

But this careful rehearsal was to avail nothing; our stolid ambassador was not to be cajoled, and on May 2nd, that is, seven days after his presenting our ultimatum, he sent for his passports.  He did not, however, set out immediately.  Yielding to an urgent request, he delayed his departure in order to hear the French reply to the British ultimatum.[255] It notified sarcastically that Lampedusa was not in the First Consul’s power to bestow, that any change