that the mission to Ibrahim-Bey is confided
     solely to M. Jaubert, and that his being sent with Colonel
     Sebastiani has been in order to conceal the real object of it, and
     to afford him a safe conveyance to Egypt, as well as for the
     purpose of assisting the Colonel in his transactions with the
     Regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli."[240]

Merry’s information was correct:  it tallied with the secret instructions given by Napoleon to Sebastiani:  and our Government, thus forewarned, at once adopted a stiffer tone on all Mediterranean and oriental questions.  Sebastiani was very coldly received by our officer commanding in Egypt, General Stuart, who informed him that no orders had as yet come from London for our evacuation of that land.  Proceeding to Cairo, the commercial emissary proposed to mediate between the Turkish Pacha and the rebellious Mamelukes, an offer which was firmly declined.[241] In vain did Sebastiani bluster and cajole by turns.  The Pacha refused to allow him to go on to Assouan, the headquarters of the insurgent Bey, and the discomfited envoy made his way back to the coast and took ship for Acre.  Thence he set sail for Corfu, where he assured the people of Napoleon’s wish that there should be an end to their civil discords.  Returning to Genoa, and posting with all speed to Paris, he arrived there on January 25th, 1803.  Five days later that gay capital was startled by the report of his mission, which was printed in full in the “Moniteur.”  It described the wretched state of the Turks in Egypt—­the Pacha of Cairo practically powerless, and on bad terms with General Stuart, the fortifications everywhere in a ruinous state, the 4,430 British troops cantoned in and near Alexandria, the Turkish forces beneath contempt.  “Six thousand French would at present be enough to conquer Egypt.”  And as to the Ionian islands, “I do not stray from the truth in assuring you that these islands will declare themselves French as soon as an opportunity shall offer itself."[242]

Such were the chief items of this report.  Various motives have been assigned for its publication.  Some writers have seen in it a crushing retort to English newspaper articles.  Others there are, as M. Thiers, who waver between the opinion that the publication of this report was either a “sudden unfortunate incident,” or a protest against the “latitude” which England allowed herself in the execution of the Treaty of Amiens.

A consideration of the actual state of affairs at the end of January, 1803, will perhaps guide us to an explanation which is more consonant with the grandeur of Napoleon’s designs.  At that time he was all-powerful in the Old World.  As First Consul for Life he was master of forty millions of men:  he was President of the Italian Republic:  to the Switzers, as to the Dutch, his word was law.  Against the infractions of the Treaty of Luneville, Austria dared make no protest.  The Czar was occupied