To these causes we may attribute the French demands of February 4th:  contradicting his earlier proposal for a temporary Neapolitan garrison of Malta, Bonaparte now absolutely refused either to grant that necessary protection to the weak Order of St. John, or to join Great Britain in an equal share of the expenses—­L20,000 a year—­which such a garrison would entail.  The astonishment and indignation aroused at Downing Street nearly led to an immediate rupture of the negotiations; and it needed all the patience of Cornwallis and the suavity of Joseph Bonaparte to smooth away the asperities caused by Napoleon’s direct intervention.  It needs only a slight acquaintance with the First Consul’s methods of thought and expression to recognize in the Protocol of February 4th the incisive speech of an autocrat confident in his newly-consolidated powers and irritated by the gibes of Peltier.[195]

The good sense of the two plenipotentiaries at Amiens before long effected a reconciliation.  Hawkesbury, writing from Downing Street, warned Cornwallis that if a rupture were to take place it must not be owing to “any impatience on our part”:  and he, in his turn, affably inquired from Joseph Bonaparte whether he had any more practicable plan than that of a Neapolitan garrison, which he had himself proposed.  No plan was forthcoming other than that of a garrison of 1,000 Swiss mercenaries; and as this was open to grave objections, the original proposal was finally restored.  On its side, the Court of St. James still refused to blow up the fortifications at Valetta; and rather than destroy those works, England had already offered that the independence of Malta should be guaranteed by the Great Powers—­Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia:  to this arrangement France soon assented.  Later on we demanded that the Neapolitan garrison should remain in Malta for three years after the evacuation of the island by the British troops; whereas France desired to limit the period to one year.  To this Cornwallis finally assented, with the proviso that, “if the Order of St. John shall not have raised a sufficient number of men, the Neapolitan troops shall remain until they shall be relieved by an adequate force, to be agreed upon by the guaranteeing Powers.”  The question of the garrison having been arranged, other details gave less trouble, and the Maltese question was settled in the thirteen conditions added to Clause X. of the definitive treaty.

Though this complex question was thus adjusted by March 17th, other matters delayed a settlement.

Hawkesbury still demanded a definite indemnity for the Prince of Orange, but Cornwallis finally assented to Article XVIII. of the treaty, which vaguely promised “an adequate compensation.”  Cornwallis also persuaded his chief to waive his claims for the direct participation of Turkey in the treaty.  The British demand for an indemnity for the expense of supporting French prisoners was to be relegated to commissioners—­who never met.  Indeed, this was the only polite way of escaping from the untenable position which our Government had heedlessly taken upon this topic.