It is now time to consider the effect which Bonaparte’s foreign policy had on his position in France.  Reserving for a later chapter an examination of the Treaty of Amiens, we may here notice the close connection between Bonaparte’s diplomatic successes and the perpetuation of his Consulate.  All thoughtful students of history must have observed the warping influence which war and diplomacy have exerted on democratic institutions.  The age of Alcibiades, the doom of the Roman Republic, and many other examples might be cited to show that free institutions can with difficulty survive the strain of a vast military organization or the insidious results of an exacting diplomacy.  But never has the gulf between democracy and personal rule been so quickly spanned as by the commanding genius of Bonaparte.

The events which disgusted both England and France with war have been described above.  Each antagonist had parried the attacks of the other.  The blow which Bonaparte had aimed at Britain’s commerce by his eastern expedition had been foiled; and a considerable French force was shut up in Egypt.  His plan of relieving his starving garrison in Malta, by concluding a maritime truce, had been seen through by us; and after a blockade of two years, Valetta fell (September, 1800).  But while Great Britain regained more than all her old power in the Mediterranean, she failed to make any impression on the land-power of France.  The First Consul in the year 1801 compelled Naples and Portugal to give up the English alliance and to exclude our vessels and goods.  In the north the results of the war had been in favour of the islanders.  The Union Jack again waved triumphant on the Baltic, and all attempts of the French to rouse and support an Irish revolt had signally failed.  Yet the French preparations for an invasion of England strained the resources of our exchequer and the patience of our people.  The weary struggle was evidently about to close in a stalemate.

For political and financial reasons the two Powers needed repose.  Bonaparte’s authority was not as yet so firmly founded that he could afford to neglect the silent longings of France for peace; his institutions had not as yet taken root; and he needed money for public works and colonial enterprises.  That he looked on peace as far more desirable for France than for England at the present time is clear from a confidential talk which he had with Roederer at the close of 1800.  This bright thinker, to whom he often unbosomed himself, took exception to his remark that England could not wish for peace; whereupon the First Consul uttered these memorable words: