Independently of the principle involved, it seems to me that the course now proposed to be pursued is liable to very grave objection.  It is an attempt to substitute the action of the Executive for that of the Legislature, and in a case in which the latter is fully competent to do the work.  For almost twenty years, Congress has been besieged with applications on the subject, but without effect.  Senate Committees have reported in favor of the measure, but the lower House, composed of the direct representatives of the people, has remained unmoved.  In despair of succeeding under any of the ordinary forms of proceeding, its friends have invoked the legislation of the Executive power, and the result is seen in the fact, that the Senate, as a branch of the Executive, is now called upon to sanction a law, in the enactment of which the House of Representatives could not be induced to unite.  This may be, and doubtless is, in accordance with the letter of the Constitution, but it is so decidedly in opposition to its spirit that, even were there no other objection, the treaty should be rejected.  That, however, is but the smallest of the objections to it.

If the people required such a law, nothing could be more easy than to act in this case as we have done before in similar ones.  When we desired to arrange for reciprocity in relation to navigation, we fixed the terms, and declared that all the other nations of the earth might accede to them if they would.  No treaty was needed, and we therefore became bound to no one.  It was in our power to repeal the law when we chose.  So, again, in regard to patents.  Foreigners exercise the power of patenting their inventions, but they do so under a law that is liable to repeal at the pleasure of Congress.  In both of these cases, the bills underwent public discussion, and the people that were to be subjected to the law, saw, and understood, and amended the bills before they became laws.  Contrast, I beg of you, this course of proceeding with the one now proposed to be pursued in reference to one of the largest branches of our internal trade.  Finding that no bill that could be prepared could stand the ordeal of public discussion, a treaty has been negotiated, the terms of which seem to be known to none but the negotiators, and that treaty has been sent to your House of Congress, there to be discussed in secret session by a number of gentlemen, most of whom have given little attention to the general principle involved, while not even a single one can be supposed qualified to judge of the practical working of the provisions by whose aid the principle is to be carried out.  Once confirmed, the treaty can be changed only with the consent of England.  Here we have secrecy in the making of laws, and irrevocability of the law when made; whereas, in all other cases, we have had publicity and revocability.  Legislation like that now proposed would seem to be better suited to the monarchies of Europe, than to the republic of the United States.  The reason why this extraordinary course has been adopted is, that the people have never required the passage of such a law, and could not be persuaded to sanction it now, were it submitted to them.