That is the gist of Napoleon’s European policy in the summer of 1806; and the surprise which he expressed to Mollien at the rejection of his offers is probably genuine.  Sensitive to the least insult himself, his bluntness of perception respecting the honour of others might almost qualify him to rank with Aristotle’s man devoid of feeling.  It is perfectly true that he did not make war on Prussia in 1806 any more than on England in 1803.  He only made peace impossible.[99]

The condition on which Prussia now urgently insisted was the entire evacuation of Germany by French troops.  This Napoleon refused to concede until Frederick William demobilized his army, a step that would have once more humbled him in the eyes of this people.  It might even have led to his dethronement.  For an incident had just occurred in Bavaria that fanned German sentiment to a flame.  A bookseller of Nuremberg, named Palm, was proved by French officers to have sold an anonymous pamphlet entitled “Germany in her deep Humiliation.”  It was by no means of a revolutionary type, and the worthy man believed it to be a mistake when he was arrested by the military authorities.  He was wrong.  Napoleon had sent orders that a terrible example must be made in order to stop the sale of patriotic German pamphlets.  Palm was therefore haled away to Braunau, an Austrian town then held by French troops, was tried by martial law and shot (August 25th).  Never did the Emperor commit a greater blunder.  The outrage sent a thrill of indignation through the length and breadth of Germany.  Instead of quenching, it inflamed the national sentiment, and thus rendered doubly difficult any peaceful compromise between Frederick William and Napoleon.  The latter was now looked upon as a tyrant by the citizen class which his reforms were designed to conciliate:  and Frederick William became almost the champion of Germany when he demanded the withdrawal of the French troops.

Unfortunately, the King refused to appoint Ministers who inspired confidence.  With Hardenberg in place of Haugwitz, men would have felt sure that the sword would not again be tamely sheathed; great efforts were made to effect this change, but met with a chilling repulse from the King.[100] It is true that Haugwitz and Beyme now expressed the bitterest hatred of Napoleon, as well they might for a man who had betrayed their confidence.  But, none the less, the King’s refusal to change his men along with his policy was fatal.  Both at St. Petersburg and London no trust was felt in Prussia as long as Haugwitz was at the helm.  The man who had twice steered the ship of state under Napoleon’s guns might do it again; and both England and Russia waited to see some irrevocable step taken before they again risked an army for that prince of waverers.