“Meanwhile, Bonaparte has left me at my ease:  for not only does he not enter into any explanation about my armaments, but he has even forbidden his Ministers to give and receive any explanations whatever.  It appears, then, that it is I who am to take the initiative.  My troops are marching on all sides to hasten that moment."[97]

These last sentences are the handwriting on the wall for the ancien regime in Prussia.  Taking the bland assurances of Talleyrand and the studied indifference of Laforest as signs that Napoleon might be caught off his guard, Prussia continued her warlike preparations; and in order to gain time Lucchesini was recalled and replaced by an envoy who was to enter into lengthy explanations.  The trick did not deceive Napoleon, who on September 3rd had heard with much surprise that Russia meant to continue the war.  At once he saw the germ of a new Coalition, and bent his energies to the task of conciliating Austria, and of fomenting the disputes between Russia and Turkey.  Towards Frederick William his tone was that of a friend who grieves at an unexpected quarrel.  How—­he exclaimed to Lucchesini on the ambassador’s departure—­how could the King credit him with encouraging the intrigues of a fussy ambassador at Cassel or the bluster of Murat?

As for Hanover, he had intended sending some one to Berlin to propose an equivalent for it in case England still made its restitution a sine qua non of peace.  “But,” he added, “if your young officers and your women at Berlin want war, I am preparing to satisfy them.  Yet my ambition turns wholly to Italy.  She is a mistress whose favours I will share with no one.  I will have all the Adriatic.  The Pope shall be my vassal, and I will conquer Sicily.  On North Germany I have no claims:  I do not object to the Hanse towns entering your confederation.  As to the inclusion of Saxony in it, my mind is not yet made up."[98]

Indeed, the tenor of his private correspondence proves that before the first week of September he did not expect a new Coalition.  He believed that England and Russia would give way before him, and that Prussia would never dare to stir.  For the Court of Berlin he had a sovereign contempt, as for the “old coalition machines” in general.  His conduct of affairs at this time betokens, not so much desire for war as lack of imagination where other persons’ susceptibilities are concerned.  It is probable that he then wanted peace with England and peace on the Continent; for his diplomacy won conquests fully as valuable as the booty of his sword, and only in a naval peace could he lay the foundations of that oriental empire which, he assured O’Meara at St. Helena, held the first place in his thoughts after the overthrow of Austria.  But it was not in his nature to make the needful concessions. “I must follow my policy in a geometrical line” he said to Lucchesini.  England might have Hanover and a few colonies if she would let Sicily go to a Bonaparte:  as for Prussia, she might absorb half-a-dozen neighbouring princelings.