[Footnote 505:  Ollech, pp. 187-192; Delbrueck’s “Gneisenau,” vol. ii., p. 205.  I cannot credit the story told by Hardinge in 1837 to Earl Stanhope ("Conversations,” p. 110), that, on the night of the 16th June, Gneisenau sought to dissuade Bluecher from joining Wellington.  Hardinge only had the story at second hand, and wrongly assigns it to Wavre.  On the afternoon of the 17th Gneisenau ordered Ziethen to keep open communications with Wellington (Ollech, p. 170).  The story that Wellington rode over to Wavre on the night of the 18th on his horse “Copenhagen” is of course a myth.]

[Footnote 506:  “Blackwood’s Magazine,” October, 1896; “Cornhill,” January, 1901.]

[Footnote 507:  Beamish’s “King’s German Legion,” vol. ii., p. 352.  Sir Hussey Vivian asserts that the allied position was by no means strong; but General Kennedy, in his “Notes on Waterloo” (p. 68), pronounces it “good and well occupied.”  A year previously Wellington noted it as a good position.  Sir Hudson Lowe then suggested that it should be fortified:  “Query, in respect to the construction of a work at Mt.  Jean, being the commanding point at the junction of two principal chaussees” ("Unpublished Memoirs").]

[Footnote 508:  Wellington has been censured by Clausewitz, Kennedy and Chesney for leaving so large a force at Hal.  Perhaps he desired to protect the King of France at Ghent, though he was surely relieved of responsibility by his despatch of June 18th, 3 a.m., begging the Duc de Berri to retire with the King to Antwerp.  It seems to me more likely that he was so confident of an early advance of the Prussians (see his other despatch of the same hour and Sir A. Frazer’s statement—­“Letters,” p. 553—­“We expected the Prussian co-operation early in the day”) as to assume that Napoleon would stake all on an effort against his right; and in that case the Hal force would have crushed the French rear, though it was very far off.]

[Footnote 509:  Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 25th, 1815.  The Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote under the Duke’s influence, stated that not more than 7,000 of the British troops had seen a shot fired.  This is incorrect.  Picton’s division, still 5,000 strong, was almost wholly composed of tried troops; and Lambert’s brigade counted 2,200 veterans; many of the Guards had seen fire, and the 52nd was a seasoned regiment.  Tomkinson (p. 296) reckons all the 5,220 British and 1,730 King’s German troopers as “efficient,” and Wellington himself, so Mercer affirms, told Bluecher he had 6,000 of the finest cavalry in the world.]

[Footnote 510:  “A British Rifleman,” p. 367.]

[Footnote 511:  I distrust the story told by Zenowicz, and given by Thiers, that Napoleon at 10 a.m. was awaiting Grouchy with impatience; also Marbot’s letter referred to in his “Memoirs,” ad fin., in which he says the Emperor bade him push on boldly towards Wavre, as the troops near St. Lambert “could be nothing else than the corps of Grouchy.”  Grouchy’s despatch and the official reply show that Napoleon knew Grouchy to be somewhere between Gembloux and Wavre.  Besides, Buelow’s report (Ollech, p. 192) states that, while at St. Lambert, he sent out two strong patrols to the S.W., and was not observed by the French, “who appeared to have no idea of our existence.”  This completely disposes of Marbot’s story.]