[Footnote 489:  The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and the French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of Lobau, 10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.]

[Footnote 490:  I follow Houssaye’s solution of this puzzle as the least unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been so perplexed.  D’Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin exactly where he might have been expected.  Was Napoleon puzzled because the corps was heading south-east instead of east?]

[Footnote 491:  Delbrueck ("Gneisenau,” vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the storm favoured the attack.]

[Footnote 492:  I here follow Delbrueck’s “Gneisenau” (vol. ii., p. 194) and Charras (vol. i., p. 163).  Reiche ("Mems.,” vol ii., p. 193) says that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th:  he notes that Bluecher and Nostitz probably owed their escape to the plainness of their uniforms and headgear.]

[Footnote 493:  “Waterloo Letters,” Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the time was 3 p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid’s account in Fitchett’s “Wellington’s Men” (p. 120).]

[Footnote 494:  “Waterloo Letters,” No. 169.]

[Footnote 495:  See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these events.]

[Footnote 496:  Ollech, pp. 167-171.  Colonel Basil Jackson, in his “Waterloo and St. Helena” (printed for private circulation), p. 64, states that he had been employed in examining and reporting on the Belgian roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre.  This report had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater confidence on the night of the 16th.]

[Footnote 497:  O’Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon’s criticism, and censures Gneisenau’s move on Wavre:  but surely Wavre combined more advantages than any other position.  It was accessible for the whole Prussian army (including Buelow); it was easily defensible (as the event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for the defence of Brussels.  Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did not at once foresee the immense consequences of his action.  Of course he did not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he took all the steps that might lead to immense consequences, if all went well.]

[Footnote 498:  Mueffling, “Passages,” p. 238:  Charras, vol. i., p. 226, discredits it.]

[Footnote 499:  Basil Jackson, op. cit., p. 24; Cotton, “A Voice from Waterloo,” p. 20.]

[Footnote 500:  Grouchy suppressed this despatch, but it was published in 1842.]

[Footnote 501:  Mercer, vol. i., p. 270.]

[Footnote 502:  Petiet, “Souvenirs militaires,” p. 204.]

[Footnote 503:  Ropes, pp. 212, 246, 359.  I follow the “received” version of this despatch.  For a comparison of it with the “Grouchy” version see Horsburgh, p. 155, note.]

[Footnote 504:  Ropes, pp. 266, 288; Houssaye, p. 316, with a good note.]