[Footnote 474:  “F.O.,” France, No. 116.  On June 9th the Duke charged Stuart, our envoy at Ghent, to defend this course, on the ground that Bluecher and he had many raw troops, and could not advance into France with safety and invest fortresses until the Russians and Austrians co-operated.]

[Footnote 475:  Sir H. Vivian states ("Waterloo Letters,” No. 70) that the Duke intended to give a ball on June 21st, the anniversary of Vittoria.  See too Sir E. Wood’s “Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign,” ch. ii.]

[Footnote 476:  “F.O.,” France, No. 115.  A French royalist sent a report, dated June 1st, recommending “point d’engagement avec Bonaparte....  Il faut user l’armee de Bonaparte:  elle ne peut plus se recruter.”]

[Footnote 477:  Ropes’s “Campaign of Waterloo,” ch. v.; Chesney, “Waterloo Lectures,” p. 100; Sir H. Maxwell’s “Wellington” (vol. ii., p. 14); and O’Connor Morris, “Campaign of 1815,” p. 97.]

[Footnote 478:  Janin, “Campagne de Waterloo,” p. 7.]

[Footnote 479:  Petiet, “Souvenirs militaires,” p. 195.]

[Footnote 480:  Credit is primarily due to Constant de Rebecque, a Belgian, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, for altering the point of concentration from Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington, to Quatre Bras; also to General Perponcher for supporting the new movement.  The Belgian side of the campaign has been well set forth by Boulger in “The Belgians at Waterloo” (1901).]

[Footnote 481:  Gourgaud, “Campagne de 1815,” ch. iv.]

[Footnote 482:  Houssaye, “1815,” pp. 133-138, 186, notes.]

[Footnote 483:  Hamley, “Operations of War,” p. 187.]

[Footnote 484:  For Gerard’s delays see Houssaye, p. 158, and Horsburgh, “Waterloo,” p. 36.  Napoleon’s tardiness is scarcely noticed by Houssaye or by Gourgaud; but it has been censured by Jomini, Charras, Clausewitz, and Lord Wolseley.]

[Footnote 485:  Ollech (p. 125) sees in it a conditional offer of help to Bluecher.  But on what ground?  It states that the Prince of Orange has one division at Quatre Bras and other troops at Nivelles:  that the British reserve would reach Genappe at noon, and their cavalry Nivelles at the same hour.  How could Bluecher hope for help from forces so weak and scattered?  See too Ropes (note to ch. x.).  Horsburgh (ch. v.) shows that Wellington believed his forces to be more to the front than they were:  he traces the error to De Lancey, chief of the staff.  But it is fair to add that Wellington thought very highly of De Lancey, and after his death at Waterloo severely blamed subordinates.]

[Footnote 486:  Stanhope, “Conversations,” p. 109.]

[Footnote 487:  Reiche, “Memoiren,” vol. ii., p. 183.]

[Footnote 488:  The term corps is significant.  Not till 3.15 did Soult use the term armee in speaking of Bluecher’s forces.  The last important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not given by Houssaye (p. 159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), Siborne (vol. i., p. 453), Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech (p. 131).  It proves that as late as 2 p.m. Napoleon expected an easy victory over the Prussians.]