Thiers does not mention these overtures of Napoleon, which are surely most characteristic.  His whole eastward move was motived by them.  Efforts have been made (e.g., by M. de Bacourt in Talleyrand’s “Mems.,” pt. vii., app. 4) to prove that on the 25th Napoleon was ready to agree to all the allied terms, and thus concede more than was done by Louis XVIII.  But there is no proof that he meant to do anything of the sort.  The terms of Caulaincourt’s note were perfectly vague.  Moreover, even on the 28th, when Napoleon was getting alarmed, he had an interview with a captured Austrian diplomatist, Wessenberg, whom he set free in order that he might confer with the Emperor Francis.  He told the envoy that France would yet give him support:  he wanted the natural frontiers, but would probably make peace on less favourable terms, as he wished to end the war:  “I am ready to renounce all the French colonies if I can thereby keep the mouth of the Scheldt for France.  England will not insist on my sacrificing Antwerp if Austria does not support her” (Arneth’s “Wessenberg,” vol. i., p. 188).  This extract shows no great desire to meet the allied terms, but rather to separate Austria from her allies.  According to Lady Burghersh ("Journals,” p. 216), Napoleon admitted to Wessenberg that his position was desperate.  I think this was a pleasing fiction of that envoy.  There is no proof that Napoleon was wholly cast down till the 29th, when he heard of La Fere Champenoise (Macdonald’s “Souvenirs").]

[Footnote 441:  Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 436, 437.]

[Footnote 442:  On hearing of their withdrawal Stein was radiant with joy:  “Now, he said, the Czar will go on to Paris, and all will soon be at an end” (Tourgueneff quoted by Haeusser, vol. iv., p. 553).]

[Footnote 443:  Bernhardi’s “Toll,” vol. iv., pp. 737 et seq.; Houssaye, pp. 354-362; also Nesselrode’s communication published in Talleyrand’s “Mems.”  Thielen and Radetzky have claimed that the initiative in this matter was Schwarzenberg’s; and Lord Burghersh, in his despatch of March 25th ("Austria,” No. 110), agrees with them.  Stein supports Toll’s claim.  I cannot agree with Houssaye (p. 407) that “Napoleon had resigned himself to the sacrifice of Paris.”  His intercepted letter, and also the official letters, Nos. 21508, 21513, 21516, 21526, 21538, show that he believed the allies would retreat and that his communications with Paris would be safe.]

[Footnote 444:  I take this account largely from Sir Hudson Lowe’s unpublished memoirs.  Napoleon blamed Marmont for not marching to Rheims as he was ordered to do.  At Elba, Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that Marmont’s disobedience spoilt the eastern movement, and ruined the campaign.  But had Marmont and Mortier joined Napoleon at Vitry, Paris would have been absolutely open to the allies.]

[Footnote 445:  Houssaye, pp. 485 et seq.; Napoleon’s letters of February 8th and March 16th; Mollien, vol. iv., p. 128.  In Napoleon’s letter of April 2nd to Joseph ("New Letters”) there is not a word of reproach to Joseph for leaving Paris.]