[Footnote 428:  Bernhardi’s “Toll,” vol. iv., p. 697.  Lord Burghersh wrote from Troyes (March 12th):  “I am convinced this army will not be risked in a general action....  S. would almost wish to be back upon the Rhine.”  So again on the 19th he wrote to Colonel Hudson Lowe from Pougy:  “I cannot say much for our activity; I am unable to explain the causes of our apathy—­the facts are too evident to be disputed.  We have been ten days at Troyes, one at Pont-sur-Seine, two at Arcis, and are now at this place.  We go tomorrow to Brienne” ("Unpublished Mems. of Sir H. Lowe").  Stewart wittily said that Napoleon came to Arcis to feel Schwarzenberg’s pulse.]

[Footnote 428:  Letters of March 20th to Clarke.]

[Footnote 430:  “Castlereagh Papers,” vol. ix., pp. 325, 332.]

[Footnote 431:  These letters were written in pairs—­the one being official, the other confidential.  Caulaincourt’s replies show that he appreciated them highly (see Fain, Appendix).]

[Footnote 432:  From Caulaincourt’s letter of March 3rd to Napoleon; Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 379.]

[Footnote 433:  “Castlereagh Papers,” vol. ix., p. 555.]

[Footnote 434:  “Castlereagh Papers,” vol. ix., pp. 335, 559.  Caulaincourt’s project of March 15th much resembled that dictated by Napoleon three days later; Austria was to have Venetia as far as the Adige, the kingdom of Italy to go to Eugene, and the duchy of Warsaw to the King of Saxony, etc.  The allies rejected it (Fain, p. 388).]

[Footnote 435:  Fournier, p. 232, rebuts, and I think successfully, Houssaye’s objections (p. 287) to its genuineness.  Besides, the letter is on the same moral level with the instructions of January 4th to Caulaincourt, and resembles them in many respects.  No forger could have known of those instructions.  At Elba, Napoleon admitted that he was wrong in not making peace at this time. “Mais je me croyais assez fort pour ne pas la faire, et je me suis trompe” (Lord Holland’s “Foreign Rem.,” p. 319).  The same writer states (p. 296) that he saw the official correspondence about Chatillon:  it gave him the highest opinion of Caulaincourt, but N.’s conduct was “full of subterfuge and artifice.”]

[Footnote 436:  Castlereagh to Clancarty, March 18th.]

[Footnote 437:  Napier, bk. xxiv., ch. iii.  Wellington seems to have thought that the allies would probably make peace with Napoleon.]

[Footnote 438:  Broglie, “Mems.,” bk. iii., ch. i.]

[Footnote 439:  Letter of February 25th to Joseph.  Thiebault gives us an odd story that Bernadotte sent an agent, Rainville, to persuade Davoust to join him in attacking the rear of the allies; but that Rainville’s nerve so forsook him in Davoust’s presence that he turned and bolted for his life!]

[Footnote 440:  Caulaincourt to Metternich on March 25th:  “Arrived only this [last] night near the Emperor, His Majesty has ... given me all the powers necessary to sign peace with the Ministers of the allied Courts” (Fain, p. 345; Ernouf, “Vie de Maret,” p. 634).