[Footnote 412:  Given by Ducasse, “Les Rois Freres de Napoleon,” p. 64.]

[Footnote 413:  Hausser, p. 503.  According to Napoleon, 6,000 men and forty cannon were captured!]

[Footnote 414:  Letter of February 18th, 1814.]

[Footnote 415:  At Elba Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that he would have made peace at Chatillon had not England insisted on his giving up Antwerp, and that England was therefore the cause of the war continuing.  This letter, however, proves that he was as set on retaining Mainz as Antwerp.  Caulaincourt then wished him to make peace while he could do so with credit ("Castlereagh Papers,” vol. ix., p. 287).]

[Footnote 416:  Fournier, pp. 132-137, 284-294, 299.]

[Footnote 417:  See Metternich’s letter to Stadion of February 15th in Fournier, pp. 319, 327.]

[Footnote 418:  Houssaye, p. 102.]

[Footnote 419:  Instructions of February 24th to Flahaut, “Corresp.,” No. 21359; Hardenberg’s “Diary,” in Fournier, pp. 363-364.]

[Footnote 420:  Fournier, pp. 170, 385.]

[Footnote 421:  Ibid., pp. 178-181, 304; Martens, vol. ix., p. 683.  Castlereagh, vol. ix., p. 336, calls it “my treaty,” and adds that England was practically supplying 300,000 men to the Coalition.  One secret article invited Spain and Sweden to accede to the treaty; another stated that Germany was to consist of a federation of sovereign princes, that Holland must receive a “suitable” military frontier, and that Italy, Spain, and Switzerland must be independent, that is, of France; a third bound the allies to keep their armies on a war footing for a suitable time after the peace.]

[Footnote 422:  See his instructions of March 2nd to Caulaincourt:  “Nothing will bring France to do anything that degrades her national character and deposes her from the rank she has held in the world for centuries.”  But it was precisely that rank which the allies were resolved to assign to her, neither more nor less.  The joint allied note of February 29th to the negotiators at Chatillon bade them “announce to the French negotiator that you are ready to discuss, in a spirit of conciliation, every modification that he might be authorized to propose”; but that any essential departure from the terms already proposed by them must lead to a rupture of the negotiations.]

[Footnote 423:  Letters of March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, to Clarke.]

[Footnote 424:  Houssaye, p. 156, note.  So too Mueffling, “Aus meinem Leben,” shows that Bluecher could have crossed the Aisne there or at Pontavaire or Berry-au-Bac.]

[Footnote 425:  See Napoleon’s letters to Clarke of March 4th-6th.]

[Footnote 426:  Houssaye, pp. 176-188.]

[Footnote 427:  Mueffling says that Bluecher and Gneisenau feared an attack by Bernadotte on their rear.  Napoleon on February 25th advised Joseph to try and gain over that prince, who had some very suspicious relations with the French General Maison in Belgium.  Probably Gneisenau wished to spare his men for political reasons.]