[Footnote 381:  That the British Ministers did not intend anything of the kind, even in the hour of triumph, is seen by Castlereagh’s despatch of November 13th, 1813, to Lord Aberdeen, our envoy at the Austrian Court:  “We don’t wish to impose any dishonourable condition upon France, which limiting the number of her ships would be:  but she must not be left in possession of this point [Antwerp]” ("Castlereagh Papers,” 3rd series, vol. i., p. 76).]

[Footnote 382:  Boyen describes the surprising effects of the fire of the British rocket battery that served in Bernadotte’s army.  Captain Bogue brought it forward to check the charge of a French column against the Swedes.  He was shot down, but Lieutenant Strangways poured in so hot a fire that the column was “blown asunder like an ant-heap,” the men rushing back to cover amidst the loud laughter of the allies.]

[Footnote 383:  The premature explosion was of course due, not to Napoleon, but to the flurry of a serjeant and the skilful flanking move of Sacken’s light troops, for which see Cathcart and Marmont.  The losses at Leipzig were rendered heavier by Napoleon’s humane refusal to set fire to the suburbs so as to keep off the allies.  He rightly said he could have saved many thousand French had he done so.  This is true.  But it is strange that he had given no order for the construction of other bridges.  Pelet and Fain affirm that he gave a verbal order; but, as Marbot explains, Berthier, the Chief of the Staff, had adopted the pedantic custom of never acting on anything less than a written order, which was not given.  The neglect to secure means for retreat is all the stranger as the final miseries at the Beresina were largely due to official blundering of the same kind.  Wellington’s criticism on Napoleon’s tactics at Leipzig is severe (despatch of January 10th, 1814):  “If Bonaparte had not placed himself in a position that every other officer would have avoided, and remained in it longer than was consistent with any ideas of prudence, he would have retired in such a state that the allies could not have ventured to approach the Rhine.”]

[Footnote 384:  Sir Charles Stewart wrote (March 22nd, 1814):  “On the Elbe Napoleon was quite insane, and his lengthened stay there was the cause of the Battle of Leipzig and all his subsequent misfortunes” ("Castlereagh Papers,” vol. ix., p. 373).]

[Footnote 385:  Napier, vol. v., pp. 368-378.]

[Footnote 386:  On November 10th Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador at the Austrian Court, wrote to Castlereagh:  " ...  As soon as he [Murat] received the last communication addressed to him by Prince Metternich and myself at Prague, he wrote to Napoleon and stated that the affairs of his kingdom absolutely demanded his presence.  Without waiting for any answer, he immediately began his journey, and did not halt a moment till he arrived at Basle.  While on the road he sent a cyphered dispatch to Prince Cariati,