[Footnote 369:  Thiers asserts that he had.  But if so, how could the Emperor have written to Macdonald (October 2nd) that the Silesian army had made a move on Grossenhain:  “It appears that this is so as to attack the intrenched camp (at Dresden) by the side of the plain, by the roads of Berlin and Meissen.”?  On the same day he scoffs at Lefebre-Desnoettes for writing that Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe, and retorts that if he had, it would be so much the worse for him:  the war would soon be over.]

[Footnote 370:  Letter of October 10th to Reynier.  This and his letter to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi’s contention ("Toll,” vol. iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg.  The Emperor’s plans shifted every few hours:  but the plan of crossing the Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]

[Footnote 371:  Martens, “Traites,” vol. ix., p. 610.  This secret bargain cut the ground from under the German unionists, like Stein, who desired to make away with the secondary princes, or strictly to limit their powers.]

[Footnote 372:  Thiers and Bernhardi ("Toll,” vol. iii., p. 388) have disposed of this fiction.]

[Footnote 373:  Sir E. Wood, “Achievements of Cavalry.”]

[Footnote 374:  “Corresp.,” No. 20814.  Marmont, vol. v., p. 281, acutely remarks that Napoleon now regarded as true only that which entered into his combinations and his thoughts.]

[Footnote 375:  Bernadotte was only hindered from retreat across the Elbe by the remonstrances of his officers, by the forward move of Bluecher, and by the fact that the Elbe bridges were now held by the French.  For the council of war at Koethen on October 14th, see Boyen, vol. ii., p. 377.]

[Footnote 376:  Mueffling, “Campaign of 1813.”]

[Footnote 377:  Colonel Lowe, who was present, says it was won and lost five times (unpublished “Memoirs").]

[Footnote 378:  Napoleon’s bulletin of October 16th, 1813, blames Ney for this waste of a great corps; but it is clear, from the official orders published by Marmont (vol. v., pp. 373-378), that Napoleon did not expect any pitched battle on the north side on the 16th.  He thought Bertrand’s corps would suffice to defend the north and west, and left the defence on that side in a singularly vague state.]

[Footnote 379:  Dedem de Gelder, “Mems.,” p. 345, severely blames Napoleon’s inaction on the 17th; either he should have attacked the allies before Bennigsen and Bernadotte came up, or have retreated while there was time.]

[Footnote 380:  Lord Burghersh, Sir George Jackson, Odeleben, and Fain all assign this conversation to the night of the 16th; but Merveldt’s official account of it (inclosed with Lord Cathcart’s despatches), gives it as on October 17th, at 2 p.m. ("F.O.,” Russia, No. 86).  I follow this version rather than that given by Fain.]