[Footnote 360:  It is clear from Napoleon’s letters of the evening of the 27th that he was not quite pleased with the day’s work, and thought the enemy would hold firm, or even renew the attack on the morrow.  They disprove Thiers’ wild statements about a general pursuit on that evening, thousands of prisoners swept up, etc.]

[Footnote 361:  Vandamme on the 28th received a reinforcement of eighteen battalions, and thenceforth had in all sixty-four; yet Marbot credits him with only 20,000 men.]

[Footnote 362:  Thiers gives Berthier’s despatch in full.  See also map, p. 336.]

[Footnote 363:  Marmont, bk. xvii., p. 158.  He and St. Cyr ("Mems.,” vol. iv., pp. 120-123) agree as to the confusion of their corps when crowded together on this road.  Napoleon’s aim was to insure the capture of all the enemy’s cannon and stores; but his hasty orders had the effect of blocking the pursuit on the middle road.  St. Cyr sent to headquarters for instruction; but these were now removed to Dresden; hence the fatal delay.]

[Footnote 364:  Thiers has shown that Mortier did not get the order from Berthier to support Vandamme until August 30th.  The same is true of St. Cyr, who did not get it till 11.30 a.m. on that day.  St. Cyr’s best defence is Napoleon’s letter of September 1st to him ("Lettres inedites de Napoleon"):  “That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to have killed himself, had not a sentinel on the mountains, nor a reserve anywhere....  I had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the heights, to encamp his troops on them, and only to send isolated parties of men into Bohemia to worry the enemy and collect news.”  With this compare Napoleon’s approving statement of August 29th to Murat ("Corresp.,” No. 20486):  “Vandamme was marching on Teplitz with all his corps.”]

[Footnote 365:  “Lettres inedites de Napoleon,” September 3rd.]

[Footnote 366:  Haeusser, vol. iv., p. 343, and Boyen, “Erinnerungen,” vol. ii., pp. 345-357, for Bernadotte’s suspicious delays on this day; also Marmont, bk. xviii., for a critique on Ney.  Napoleon sent for Lejeune, then leading a division of Ney’s army, to explain the disaster; but when Lejeune reached the headquarters at Dohna, south of Dresden, the Emperor bade him instantly return—­a proof of his impatience and anger at these reverses.]

[Footnote 367:  Thornton, our envoy at Bernadotte’s headquarters, wrote to Castlereagh that that leader’s desire was to spare the Swedish corps; he expected that Bernadotte would aim at the French crown ("Castlereagh Papers,” 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 48-59).  See too Boyen, vol. ii., p. 378.]

[Footnote 368:  Letter of October 10th to Reynier.  This and his letter to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi’s contention ("Toll,” vol. iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg.  The Emperor’s plans shifted every few hours:  but the plan of crossing the Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]